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The following essay was originally submitted as an assignment for my university and was graded as a first-class essay.

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Since the 7/7 Bombings, Islamist terror has posed an ever-lingering threat in the minds of the British public, becoming a mainstay on the policymaking agenda. At the very heart of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy lies the controversial Prevent programme, which has long stood accused of transforming “nurseries, schools, universities, hospitals, and other key sites of social welfare into sites of discrimination, racism and exclusion” (Amnesty International UK, 2023). With the release of the long-awaited Shawcross review once again sparking debate about the ethicality and effectiveness of Britain’s Prevent programme, the question must be asked: do policymakers really understand Islamist terror and the best way to counter it?

In this essay, I comprehensively analyse Islamist terror and critically assess Prevent to highlight how misconceptions about terrorism have contributed to flawed policy delivery. In the first section, I introduce the concept of Islamist terror with a brief overview of its historical origins. In the second section, I discuss the prevailing theory of terrorism and the ideological underpinnings of Islamism via the case studies of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State to uncover the primary cause of Islamist terror: ideology. In the third section, I outline Prevent’s operational framework, outlining how it falls short of sufficiently addressing the problem of radicalisation. In the final section, I conclude with a recap of the main arguments made in sections one through three.

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Introducing Islamist Terror

The UN minimally defines terrorism as the coercion of populations or governments via violent criminal acts that provoke a sense of terror, such as bombing and hostage-taking (UN Security Council, 2004). In particular, Islamist terror can be defined as terrorism carried out by organisations and individuals primarily motivated by varying interpretations of Islamic political principles or by Muslim religious and communal identity generally referred to as Islamism (Piazza, 2009). Regarding methodology, Islamist groups employ various tactics, from kidnappings to executions. That said, none is more closely associated with Islamist terror than the notorious suicide attack (Choi & Brown, 2022). In terms of distribution, most terror attacks occur in Muslim-majority countries. In 2022, 80% of all terror-related deaths occurred in Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, Niger and Iraq (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2023, p. 14).

The historical origin of Islamist terror is subject to considerable debate, and due to its proximity to a major world religion, discussions are inevitably shrouded in religious polemics. Critics of Islam often claim that terrorism is intrinsically linked to and has been a feature of the religion from its inception, citing the early Kharijites as the first manifestation of Islamic extremism (Warraq, 2017). Some go even further, perpetuating the absurd idea that the “world of Islam” invented modern terrorism by paradoxically referring to the medieval Order of Assassins based in 10^th-century Persia (McAlister, 2005, p. 219). However, when one considers the excess of violence and terrorism committed by all sorts of religious groups, from the 1^st-century Jewish Sicarii Zealots to the contemporary Hindu Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the baselessness of such claims becomes immediately apparent. And while it is true that violence has indeed played a part in Islamicate history – just like it has in the rest of human history – Islamist terror is only a relatively recent phenomenon.

One of the first major instances of modern Islamist terror – terrorism primarily motivated by Islamism as opposed to other ideologies – was the 1981 Assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Sadat’s regime sought to modernise Egypt by normalising relations with Israel and the West via his Infitah policy, alienating those segments of society who viewed Sadat’s regime as promoting anti-Islamic principles, eventually prompting Egyptian Islamic Jihad member Khalid al-Islambouli to take matters into his own hands assassinating Sadat in full view of the public during Egypt’s annual victory parade. The event came to symbolise the culmination of decades of growing Islamist sentiment in Egypt and beyond (Gerges, 2018, pp. 314-342).

In the decades following Sadat’s assassination, Islamist sentiment continued to grow, particularly during the Soviet-Afghan War, which saw the emergence of Al-Qaeda from the Western-backed Afghan Mujahideen. In 2001, Al-Qaeda carried out its infamous 9/11 Attacks prompting the US to launch its international War on Terror. The following two decades saw the devastating Iraq War, the Arab Spring, the rise and fall of Islamic State, and the Taliban’s successful insurgency in Afghanistan. During the height of the War on Terror, four Islamist groups – Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda – were responsible for 74% of all terror-related deaths in 2015, marking Islamist terror as one of the most deadliest forms of terrorism in recent history (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2016, p. 4).

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Analysing Islamist Terror

Terrorism as a phenomenon is best explained using David Rapoport’s famous Wave Theory, which asserts that modern terrorism consists of four consecutive waves: anarchist, nationalist, new left, and religious (Rapoport, 2004). Each of the four waves of terrorism is unique in its own right but can broadly be divided into what scholars term ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism, with the first three waves coinciding with the former and the fourth wave coinciding with the latter. The old terrorism of the first three waves is characterised by well-defined political goals and carefully calibrated violence aimed at attracting popular support. Think of the Irish Republican Army or the Indian Naxalites. Meanwhile, the new terrorism of the fourth wave does not care for popular support but rather seeks to wrought unspeakable carnage in the name of religion. “It is the anti-order of the new world order of the twenty-first century” (Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 158). In addition to the original four waves, a growing number of scholars have begun sharing their predictions about the possible nature of a fifth wave, with ideas ranging from lone cyber terrorists to terrorist semi-states (Kaplan, 2008) (Auger, 2020). However, for the purposes of this essay, I will be focusing on the regnant religious wave.

According to Rapoport, “Islam is at the heart of the wave” (Rapoport, 2013, p. 295). Labelling a world religion responsible for an entire generation of terrorism is problematic for obvious reasons. Theory inevitably influences practice, and – as I demonstrate in the next section – such a theory can have regrettable consequences. But not only that, as Rapoport is well aware, Muslims are not the only perpetrators of religious terror. The 1992 Babri Masjid Demolition, 1994 Hebron Massacre, and 1995 Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack are a few examples that spring to mind. Furthermore, it is important to note that religious terror is not caused by religion alone but rather a coalescence of political, social, and ideological circumstances couched in religious rhetoric (Juergensmeyer, 2004, p. 10). That said, there is no denying the prominence of Islamist terror as the prevailing form of terrorism over the previous four decades. Thus, I consider Rapoport’s problematic observation a simple case of poor word choice; ‘Islam’, the religion, may not be at the heart of the wave, but ‘Islamism’, the political ideology that precipitates ‘Islamist’ terror, most certainly is.

This begs the question: how do we address Islamist terror? To answer, we must first understand the general causal factors of terrorism. Broadly speaking, there are three main categories of factors that contribute to modern terrorism: socio-economic factors, psychological factors, and ideological factors (Wojciechowski, 2017, pp. 63-66).

For terrorism to take root, certain permissive socio-economic conditions, such as poverty and unemployment, must exist to generate and intensify radical attitudes (Newman, 2006, p. 764). Globalisation stands out as a particularly significant factor, as it threatens local societal norms and economic standing, leading to intercultural conflict, especially in the global south (Stevens, 2002). As it stands, less-developed countries experience the greatest threat from terrorist activity (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2023, pp. 20-30). Furthermore, terrorist organisations often rely on international markets and foreign regimes for financial backing. For instance, the Taliban generates funding by cultivating and exporting opium (Clarke, 2015, pp. 113-133).

Radical attitudes often occur in individuals exhibiting specific psychological processes, such as hatred, prejudice, injustice and trauma (Horgan, 2003). This is evidenced by the prevalence of ‘us-versus-them’ narratives found in all manner of terrorist movements and individual actors. For example, the murderers of British soldier Lee Rigby were motivated by feelings of injustice and hatred towards the West. Another shared characteristic among terrorist groups is the belief that ‘the cause’ takes precedence over everything, including one’s own life, leading terrorists to engage in destructive and violent activities. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the case of Islamist terror and its glorification of martyrdom (Moghadam, 2008).

At the heart of every terrorist movement lies an ideology that channels radical attitudes, legitimising violence as a valid means to enact its goals. In the case of Islamist terror, this ideology is Islamism which emerged as a response to encroaching European influence over the Islamicate world following the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. Early Islamists sought to define Islam as a political system to counterweight other major ideologies of the time and legitimised their new vision by proclaiming a return to the true teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah (Roy, 1994, p. 35). However, Islam is not a monolith, and there are nearly as many interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunnah as there are Muslims, as reflected by the multitude of militant and non-militant political movements that fall under the umbrella of Islamism, each with different ideas about what Islamic governance should look like. This has led some to accuse the terms ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamist’ of being too wide and flexible to be considered useful (Valbjørn, 2017).

Nevertheless, the numerous Islamist movements can be broadly grouped into three streams: electoral, authoritarian and revolutionary (Gaub, 2014). As typified by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami, electoral Islamism calls for society’s gradual and progressive re-Islamisation and the establishment of Islamic governance via participation in existing political structures. On the other hand, authoritarian Islamism refers to existing regimes that frame themselves as legitimate Islamic governments, imposing their specific brand of Islamic theology on domestic and foreign populations, such as Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi doctrine. Meanwhile, revolutionary Islamism – the object of this analysis – asserts that existing political structures must be violently overthrown to establish proper Islamic governance. Despite these differences, the three streams are not discrete, and movements may shift from one stream to another, as was the case during the 1979 Iranian Revolution when Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolutionary Islamist movement overthrew the Iranian Shahdom and established a new theocratic authoritarian regime.

The beginnings of revolutionary Islamism can be traced to the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1950s and 1960s, who felt that the group’s gradual and progressive approach wasn’t conducive to the establishment of proper Islamic governance. In the preface to his seminal work Ma’alim fi al-Tariq – Milestones in English – Qutb claims that the entire world, both Muslim and non-Muslim, has reverted to a state of Jahiliyyah, meaning godless ignorance embodied by capitalist and communist systems. If Jahiliyyah is the disease, then, according to Qutb, violent Jihad, meaning struggle against the enemies of Islam and their structures of Jahiliyyah, is the cure. He identifies two such enemies of Islam: the near enemy, Muslims that have supposedly strayed from Islamic teachings, and the far enemy, non-Muslims that perpetuate anti-Islamic lifestyles (Qutb, 1964). Following his execution in 1966, Qutb’s revolutionary framework has gone on to influence every major Islamist terror group, both Sunni and Shia (Belt, 2006).

Having understood Islamism’s ideological underpinnings, we must now turn our attention to the terror groups that digest its teachings. To that end, I have chosen to conduct a brief comparative study of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State as both feature prominently in the public consciousness yet represent two distinct manifestations of Qutb’s revolutionary approach.

Emerging out of the Afghan Mujahideen in the late 1980s, Al-Qaeda soon evolved into an international network of Islamist terror cells drawing global attention with its infamous 9/11 Attacks. Over two decades later, in the wake of the Iraq War, Islamic State split from Al-Qaeda, declaring itself a caliphate in 2014. While both organisations have their foundations in Qutbism, they have since ideologically evolved and diverged in response to their differing prioritised targets. Al-Qaeda’s preoccupation with attacking the militarily superior West – the far enemy – has forced it to embrace a big tent approach focused on forming alliances and coalitions with various Islamist factions, such as the Taliban, despite ideological differences. Meanwhile, Islamic State’s focus on local Muslim regimes – the near enemy – has pushed it towards adopting an uncompromising system of Islamic governance aimed at preserving its territorial holdings, leading to clashes with other Islamist terror groups, including Al-Qaeda (Kamolnick, 2017, pp. xv-xxiv).

Al-Qaeda and Islamic State share the same goal of establishing global Islamic governance yet follow two contrasting grand strategies. Islamic State’s strategy involves destabilising regimes to ensure the swift annexation of territory before immediately engaging in the re-Islamisation of its conquered populations. This process of re-Islamisation follows extreme interpretations of Islamic law, leaving no room for deviation, thereby isolating Islamic State from other Islamist groups. In comparison, Al-Qaeda takes a more gradual approach, seeking to free all Muslims from the structures of Jahiliyyah by co-opting local Islamist movements and embedding itself in popular uprisings before beginning the re-Islamisation of Muslim society. This strategy makes Al-Qaeda the more pragmatic and less exclusionary of the two organisations. Simply put: “[Islamic State] is a political extremist actor, while [Al-Qaeda] has become an extremist political actor” (Wilson Center, 2016, pp. 6-8).

Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s ideological and strategic differences are reflected in their respective organisational structures and preferred tactics. Al-Qaeda follows a decentralised structure, relying on a loose network of affiliated groups and individuals, allowing for greater autonomy among its regional branches (Habeck, 2019). This ensures that the organisation can continue to absorb a diverse range of Islamist groups into its network without risking collapse into infighting. It also provides the clandestine flexibility needed to perform large-scale theatrical attacks against symbolic Western institutions. On the other hand, Islamic State follows a more centralised and hierarchical organisational structure, dividing its territories into provinces headed by appointed governors (Quivooij, 2015, p. 7). During the height of its power, Islamic State favoured conventional warfare tactics, successfully capturing large swaths of Iraq and Syria. However, since losing all its major territories, it has begun embracing the more theatrical approach practised by Al-Qaeda with incidents such as the Manchester Arena Bombing. Despite their differences, both Al-Qaeda and Islamic State devote significant time to producing propaganda with the aim of normalising violent Jihad and radicalising disenfranchised Muslims worldwide (Europol, 2022).

This brings us back to the question at hand: how do we address Islamist terror? Of the three types of causal factors, I’d argue socio-economic conditions and psychological processes are but precursors to the motivator: ideology. They are the bullet and the gun; ideology is what determines whether an individual pulls the trigger. A study by Mark Juergensmeyer revealed that three factors are responsible for ending religious terror: infighting, a loss of faith in the ideology, and opportunities for non-violent alternatives (Juergensmeyer, 2022). As such, the key to ending Islamist terror lies in the ideological deconstruction of revolutionary Islamism (Alkaff & Mahzam, 2018, p. 58; Kamolnick, 2017, pp. 191-197; Wilson Center, 2016, p. 39).

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Assessing Prevent

The UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, consists of four principal strands: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. The most controversial strand, Prevent – the object of this assessment – focuses on tackling the problem of radicalisation to reduce terrorist intent. Building on this, Pursue focuses on disrupting terrorist actors and their operations to reduce terrorist capability. Coming from a more defensive angle, Protect focuses on strengthening existing security infrastructure to reduce the UK’s vulnerability to terrorism. Similarly, Prepare focuses on enhancing responses to terrorist attacks to reduce the impact of terrorism. By reducing intent, capability, vulnerability and impact, CONTEST aims to reduce the overall risk of terrorism (HM Government, 2018, p. 27).

Prevent is comprised of three key objectives. The first objective is to address the primary motivator of terrorism – ideology – by “galvanising the rejection of terrorist narratives” (HM Government, 2018, p. 33). To do this, Prevent carries out a two-pronged assault by working with civil society organisations to educate the general public on the folly of terrorism while simultaneously suppressing terrorist propaganda. From 2010 to 2018, the Police Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit worked with communication service providers to remove over 300,000 pieces of terrorist-related content from the internet (Counter Terrorism Policing, 2018). In the year ending 31^st March 2021, Prevent funded 225 community-based projects, reaching over 133,000 participants (Home Office, 2021a).

The second objective is to “safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalisation through early intervention” (HM Government, 2018, p. 31). Under section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, public sector authorities must undergo training to identify and refer at-risk individuals to Prevent for further investigation. If an individual is found to be vulnerable, they may be offered support via Channel, a confidential multi-agency safeguarding programme. In the year ending 31^st March 2022, 6,406 individuals were referred to Prevent in England and Wales, 13% of whom participated in the Channel programme (Home Office, 2023a).

The third and final objective is to reduce reoffending by “enabling those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate” (HM Government, 2018, p. 40). This is primarily carried out by the mandatory Desistance and Disengagement Programme, which provides one-to-one support to individuals convicted and suspected of terror-related offences via specialist intervention providers. Since its introduction in 2016, over 500 participants have taken part in the programme (Home Office, 2023b).

Since its inception, Prevent and the broader CONTEST strategy has consistently identified Islamist terror as the primary threat to the UK’s national security despite recognising the rise of right-wing extremism in recent years (HM Government, 2006, pp. 6-8; 2009, pp. 21-52; 2011a, pp. 13-21; 2011b, pp. 20-37; 2018, pp. 15-24). Between 2016 and 2022, there was a total of 36,677 Prevent referrals, a third of which related to concerns about Islamist terror. Of these 12,203 referrals regarding Islamist terror, only 11% were adopted as Channel cases (Home Office, 2017; 2018a; 2018b; 2019; 2020; 2021b; 2023a).

On a putative level, the Prevent programme offers a comprehensive solution to the issue of Islamist radicalisation. That said, critics have raised several concerns about the ethicality and effectiveness of its stringent pre-emptive measures.

The foremost charge laid against Prevent is the accusation that it unfairly targets the British Muslim community, leading to discrimination and stigmatisation (Holmwood & Aitlhadj, 2022, pp. 5-6). The programme’s emphasis on identifying extremism within Muslim communities promotes the fallacious narrative that all terrorists are Muslim (Corbin, 2017). A narrative that Western media outlets have long since promoted: atrocities committed by Muslims receive six times more coverage and are nine times more likely to be associated with the term ‘terrorism’ than those committed by white supremacists (Hanif, 2020). This, in turn, contributes to existing feelings of marginalisation and lends credence to the ‘us-versus-them’ narratives that Islamist terror groups rely on to radicalise vulnerable individuals.

Secondly, there are also concerns that Prevent is based on flawed understandings of radicalisation, as evidenced by the vast majority of referrals failing to make it onto the Channel programme. This indicates that Prevent training has failed to properly educate public sector authorities on the tell-tale signs of radicalisation. In particular, the disproportionately high number of Islamist referrals seems to result from the misguided belief that religiosity equals extremism. For instance, take the case of a 15-year-old boy who was referred to Prevent for refusing to participate in mixed PE sessions and requesting time to attend Friday prayers (Holmwood & Aitlhadj, 2022, p. 58). On the contrary, academic research supports the view that Muslim religiosity entails a positive sense of national identity (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2015).

Another charge laid against Prevent is that it negatively impacts freedom of expression by forcing individuals to engage in self-censorship out of fear of being reported as potential terrorists (Younis & Jadhav, 2019). This only further isolates vulnerable individuals making them more susceptible to Islamist influence. Only by sharing potentially extremist views can society engage in the ideological deconstruction of terrorist narratives necessary to prevent radicalisation. Furthermore, critics have also pointed out the potential for Prevent to be weaponised against legitimate political dissent, thus tying into broader fears about the UK’s gradual evolution into a police state via the process of securitisation (Mohammed & Siddiqui, 2013).

Despite these valid concerns, the government’s Independent Review of Prevent, led by William Shawcross, concluded that the programme was not Islamophobic, stating “Islamism as an ideology is not the same as Islam as a faith [and] it is not anti-Muslim to try to prevent the spread of that brutal ideology” (Shawcross, 2023, p. 4). As of March 2022, only 16% of Prevent referrals were in relation to Islamist terror compared to 22% the previous year, an overall decrease of 72% since 2017 (Home Office, 2023a). It remains to be seen whether this trend will continue or reverse in the subsequent years following Shawcross’ call to refocus Prevent’s efforts on tackling Islamist terror (Shawcross, 2023, pp. 7-8). What is certain, however, is that Prevent has played a significant role in the marginalisation of British Muslims, creating the very conditions which allow Islamism to persist.

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Conclusion

To recap, I began this essay by briefly introducing Islamist terror – terrorism carried out by organisations and individuals primarily motivated by revolutionary Islamism – highlighting its preferred tactics, distribution and historical origins. Contrary to what religious polemicists may claim, I emphasised that Islamism is a relatively recent phenomenon, a product of the 20^th century.

In the second section, I delved into a deep analysis of Islamist terror, employing Rapoport’s Wave Theory to understand its place within the broader context of terrorism and clarifying the distinction between Islam as a religion and Islamism as the political ideology driving Islamist terror. I then discussed the three factors contributing to terrorism, identifying ideological factors as the primary motivator with socio-economic factors and psychological factors as necessary precursors.

Focusing on the ideological underpinnings of Islamist terror, I examined the three streams of Islamism – electoral, authoritarian and revolutionary – before highlighting Qubtism as a significant influence on all major Islamist terror groups. Following this, I conducted a comparative study of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State to demonstrate their distinct applications of Qubt’s revolutionary ideology and contrasting strategies in pursuing the establishment of global Islamic governance. I ended the section by highlighting that the key to ending Islamist terror lies in the ideological deconstruction of revolutionary Islamism.

In the third section, I began by providing an overview of Prevent’s operational tenets and objectives, including statistical information where appropriate, before highlighting some of the key criticisms lodged against it. Despite its noble goal of protecting vulnerable individuals from the threat of radicalisation, Prevent has done more harm than good. The programme’s deliberate targeting of the British Muslim community has contributed to marginalisation, precipitating feelings of distrust and injustice that lead to radicalisation. Simply put, Prevent is contributing to the very phenomena it wishes to stop.

In conclusion, addressing Islamist terror requires a multifaceted approach that considers socio-economic conditions, psychological processes, and ideological influences. Policymakers must strive for nuanced understanding and tailor counter-terrorism strategies accordingly. It is crucial that policymakers continuously reassess and refine their approaches to stay ahead of evolving forms of terrorism and ensure the safety and security of the public. By acknowledging the complexities and specificities of Islamist terror, more effective and targeted measures can be developed to counter its persistent threat.

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Big Brother is watching you.

George Orwell
Nineteen Eighty-Four

In 1785, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of modern utilitarianism, designed a prison where a single guard could observe all the prisoners without them knowing, compelling them to regulate their behaviour out of fear of being watched. In effect, the prisoners could be controlled without having to lift a finger, power firmly in the hands of that single guard. The prison came to be known as the Panopticon, and since 1785, not a single one has been constructed. However, with the power of mass surveillance, Britain is becoming a nationwide Panopticon where citizens are the prisoners and the state their all-powerful guard.

If the documents leaked by Edward Snowden back in June 2013 taught us anything, it’s that not everything is as it appears to be on the surface. The state may appear to be a neutral actor, allowing us to get on with our lives without interference. However, as the documents have shown us, computer systems capable of intercepting and storing large amounts of our personal data have been utilised by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to spy on the British public without our consent (Amnesty International, 2020). Worse still, our data is being shared with the US, giving Uncle Sam a direct view into our private lives.

Mass surveillance is no longer bound to the pages of science fiction; it has become the reality of the world we live in. The question is: how did we get here?

After 9/11, the US used its global hegemony to launch an international War on Terror. As President Bush put it to the world: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” From then on, governments the world over introduced new measures that curbed our freedoms in the name of national security. And we, in our grief and fear, accepted these new measures, believing it to be common sense, blind to the fact our hard-fought civil liberties were being stolen before our very eyes.

No government would go further to support the US in its endeavour to murder nearly 400,000 non-combatants than Tony Blair’s (Watson Institute, 2021). Throughout his government, laws were introduced that severely impeded our civil liberties, including giving police the power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion (Terrorism Act 2000) and arrest and detain without charge for up to 28 days (Terrorism Act 2006). As you can imagine, these powers were virulently abused by police, particularly when it came to shutting down political dissent.

In March 2003, anti-war protesters were prevented from reaching RAF Fairford, a British military base used by American bombers during the Invasion of Iraq. They were sent back to London under heavy police escort, violating their right to protest (BBC, 2013). Or take the case of Walter Wolfgang, a Jewish refugee who fled Nazi Germany in the lead-up to WWII. In September 2005, he was kicked out of a Labour conference by police after calling Jack Straw’s policy on Iraq “nonsense” (Busby, 2019). These incidents of abuse prove the police are nothing more than the coercive arm of the state.

But perhaps none of Blair’s enactments was quite as Orwellian as the Identity Cards Act 2006, requiring citizens to register for an identity card linked to a national database. The National Identity Register (NIR) stored detailed information regarding each citizen throughout their lives with plans to include even more in the future. This information would make it easier for the state to single out anyone who disagreed with its policies, bringing us all one step closer to living under an authoritarian regime. The intention was to make it compulsory to enter your details into the NIR when you apply for a new passport. Luckily, the scheme was scrapped, and the NIR was destroyed under the 2010 coalition government before this could happen.

Thanks to agitation from various human rights groups, subsequent governments continued to repeal or amend some of the provisions introduced under Blair. That being said, it would be naive to assume the days of mass surveillance are behind us.

As it stands, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 gives the government unprecedented power to spy on the British population. A total of 48 state authorities, including GCHQ, have the power to access our internet connection records without a warrant. And with tech companies willing to sell our data to the state and private firms around the world, there is nowhere left on Earth where we can be safe from the prying eyes of the political and economic elite.

But surely there’s no need to worry if we have nothing to hide? After all, these measures are designed to catch terrorists, not spy on innocent civilians.

The problem isn’t about whether we have something to hide; it’s about what can be done with our data once it’s in the hands of the state. As the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica Data Scandal demonstrated, tech companies have already harvested our data and used it to shape our preferences, influencing our response to key political events in favour of the global elite. If private firms are doing this, then it’s highly likely that state apparatus, such as GCHQ with its advanced surveillance technology, is being utilised by the political elite to do the same. Surveillance is simply another means to maintain power via the manufactured consent of the public.

So, what can we do about it?

While it may seem too late to stem the tide of mass surveillance, organisations such as Amnesty International have already been fighting on our behalf. Earlier this year, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the UK’s surveillance capabilities violated our human rights to privacy and freedom of expression (Amnesty International, 2021). The ruling was a huge step towards getting this issue on the world stage, and now it falls to us to see our governments held accountable lest we find ourselves living in the world described in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. If we keep the pressure on and continue to petition our government to cease its invasion of our private lives, I’m confident that one day, we will see the abolishment of mass surveillance altogether.

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Amnesty International, 2020. Why we’re taking the UK government to court over mass spying, London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, 2021. UK: Europe’s top court rules UK mass surveillance regime violated human rights, London: Amnesty International.

BBC, 2013. RAF Fairford protesters win legal battle against police, London: BBC.

Busby, M., 2019. Walter Wolfgang, antiwar activist and Jack Straw heckler, dies aged 95, London: The Guardian.

Watson Institute, 2021. Costs of War – Civilians Killed & Wounded. [Online] Available at: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians [Accessed 18 January 2023].