The politicisation of the Civil Service has been debated for decades.
The following essay was originally submitted as an assignment for my university and was graded as a 2:1.
In March 2023, Conservative Party supporters received an email, signed by then-Home Secretary Suella Braverman, accusing civil servants of blocking attempts at stopping small boat crossings as part of a left-wing “activist blob”. Braverman later denied she sent the email after being accused of breaking the Ministerial Code for failing to uphold the political impartiality of the Civil Service (Wheeler, 2023). Regardless of whether she is guilty or not, the event evokes an ongoing debate surrounding the Civil Service: should the Civil Service be politicised?
In this essay, I draw upon my undergraduate studies in Policy, Politics and Economics and my personal experience as a student intern with the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) to argue in favour of impartiality. First, I begin by expanding upon the meaning of the term ‘politicisation’ and what it means to politicise the Civil Service. Following this, I explain why an impartial Civil Service benefits British society. Next, I consider the legitimate concerns of those advocating for the Civil Service’s politicisation, proposing special advisors as an avenue for reform. To conclude, I summarise the key arguments made throughout this essay.
What is ‘Politicisation’?
In political science, the term ‘politicisation’ refers to the process of promoting a particular issue from the realm of necessity (non-political) to the realm of contingency and deliberation (political) (Hay, 2007, pp. 78-87). In other words, politicisation is the opening up of issues to political debate, influence or practice, thereby making previously unpolitical issues political. Thus, the more politicised an issue, the more people participate in its debate, and the more its positions are polarised (Zürn, 2019).
When discussing politicisation in liberal democracies, government institutions can be broadly divided into two categories: majoritarian (politicised) and non-majoritarian (impartial) (Majone, 2001; Thatcher & Sweet, 2002). Majoritarian institutions, such as Parliament, are those representing the will of the majority and whose agents are usually publicly elected by popular vote. As such, their agents are subject to short-term political considerations, utilising political rhetoric to maintain their position in government. On the other hand, non-majoritarian institutions, such as the Civil Service, are those exercising specialised public authority and whose agents are neither publicly elected nor directly managed by elected officials. As such, their agents are subject to long-term policy considerations, tending towards moderation and compromise.
When we discuss the politicisation of the Civil Service, we are referring to an increase in Parliament’s control over the Civil Service’s operations and an increase in political activity and bias from civil servants. In a practical sense, this would involve ministers having the power to appoint the civil servants who work under them, inevitably choosing individuals with overt political affiliations to the ruling party. In other words, turning the Civil Service from a non-majoritarian institution based on merit into a majoritarian institution based on patronage. Doing so would lead to the increased politicisation of public policymaking, which up until now has followed a pragmatic, moderate approach informed by professional expertise as opposed to political ideology.
Why Impartiality Serves the British Public
Impartiality is listed as one of the Civil Service’s core values, alongside honesty, integrity and objectivity. According to The Civil Service Code, impartiality is “acting solely according to the merits of the case and serving equally well governments of different political persuasions” (Civil Service, 2010). To maintain impartiality, civil servants are restricted from participating in political activities without the prior consent of their respective departments. Furthermore, certain civil servants, such as senior officials and those on the Civil Service Fast Stream, are barred from participating in national political activities altogether (Civil Service, 2016).
It is evident from official Civil Service guidelines that, at least in theory, civil servants are required to remain politically impartial. Whether this is indeed the case in practice lies beyond the scope of this essay, especially when you consider the myriad of definitions for what counts as ‘politics’ (Hay, 2007, pp. 61-65). Instead, this essay focuses on the rationale behind the Civil Service’s normative emphasis on impartiality rather than its empirical practice of impartiality. That said, having spent a week working with DBT, I can attest it was highly discouraged and frowned upon to have any kind of political discussions in the workplace, more so than anywhere else I have worked. Many of the civil servants I spoke to expressed frustration with having their political expression restricted. Politicising the Civil Service may ease this frustration, but will it be conducive to the betterment of British society?
To understand why the Civil Service emphasises political impartiality, we must familiarise ourselves with the institution’s history. In 1806, the East India Company established the East India College in Haileybury, taking inspiration from imperial China’s examination system to train administrators to serve in India. Over the next few decades, a similar examination system was called for by members of Parliament to replace the old patronage system used to appoint civil servants, culminating in the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Reporton the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service. The report used the East India Company as a model to advocate for a unified and impartial civil service where appointments were based on merit instead of patronage (Northcote & Trevelyan, 1854). These proposed reforms were gradually implemented at varying paces across government departments, laying the foundations of the Civil Service (Coolican, 2018; Heffer, 2013, pp. 469-505). However, it wasn’t until the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 that any of these reforms were codified in law.
The Northcote-Trevelyan Report argued appointments should be made through open and competitive examinations rather than patronage to ensure individuals with the necessary skills and qualifications are selected. Today, the Civil Service conducts competitive examinations to ensure only the best candidates are appointed to senior positions through schemes such as the Civil Service Fast Stream. For specialist roles requiring a particular skill or knowledge base, only candidates who can prove they have the necessary experience are allowed to enter the role.
DBT’s International Trade Advisors (ITAs) must have at least five years of commercial experience. As a direct result of employing qualified and competent ITAs, DBT secured 4,935 export wins for UK businesses from March 2022 to March 2023 (Department for Business & Trade, 2023). Thus, the Civil Service’s merit-based appointments benefit the UK economy and, by extension, British society. Had these appointments been made based on patronage, it is unlikely DBT would have had the same success. This is evidenced by the lack of success experienced by countries with more politicised civil services. For example, in March 2023, Nigeria’s goods exports only totalled ₦6,487 billion (£6.4 billion) compared to the UK’s £37.7 billion (HM Revenue & Customs, 2023; National Bureau of Statistics, 2023, p. 28).
The report also highlighted political impartiality as crucial to maintaining a consistent approach to public policy. Under a politicised system, public policy would constantly shift with the changing winds of government. Similarly, political bias would obscure the Civil Service from taking advantage of opportunities that do not fit the ruling party’s agenda. By remaining impartial, the Civil Service maintains an unbiased, long-term approach to policy implementation.
During my placement, DBT was working to support the British Halal industry with an aim to increase Britain’s Halal exports. The global Halal industry is one of the fastest-growing industries in the world, with an annual estimated growth rate of 20%, and is valued at about $560 billion (£444 billion) a year (Azam & Abdullah, 2020). Tapping into this lucrative market only serves to boost the UK economy and benefit British society. Had the Civil Service been politicised and the DBT’s senior leadership been chosen by Parliament, it’s improbable that DBT would have committed its resources to supporting the British Halal industry due to the ruling Conservative Party’s insensitivities towards the Muslim community (Allen, 2021). Had this been the case, it would have been a missed opportunity to boost the UK economy, thereby hindering British society. Luckily, the Civil Service’s pragmatism prevailed over political rhetoric.
Lastly, the report emphasised the need for public confidence in the Civil Service. By remaining politically impartial, civil servants would be perceived as serving the public interest rather than political agendas. This fosters trust in the government and ensures decisions are made with public welfare in mind. This is especially important when working with members of the public who may distrust the politics of Parliament.
At the end of my placement, I was tasked with canvassing the Manchester Halal Expo to identify high-export potential businesses and inform them about DBT’s support services. Many of the businesses I spoke to were suspicious of the government due to the Conservative Party’s reputation for being Islamophobic. However, once I explained that DBT and the wider Civil Service is independent of Parliament and its staff is not appointed by the Conservative Party, they became more open to learning about the support DBT provides. Thus, impartiality helps build the Civil Service’s relationship with British citizens, regardless of their political leanings.
Why Politicisation Won’t Save the Civil Service
There is no doubt the Civil Service has its issues: poor performance management, a preference for the privately educated, and the obstruction of Parliamentary priorities, among others (Foster, 2016; Friedman, 2021; Hymas & Malnick, 2023). However, is politicisation really the answer?
Proponents of politicisation often point towards the deteriorating relationship between civil servants and ministers as evidence impartiality isn’t working. The assumption is that politically aligned civil servants would be more zealous, less risk-averse, and directly accountable to ministers. Yet, this overlooks the merits of impartiality and the downsides of politicisation discussed above. The real reason behind the deteriorating relationship is the inherent difficulty of addressing complex issues. Policy decisions related to Brexit, the aftermath of the Coronavirus, and the cost-of-living crisis are inherently thorny and time-sensitive. While frustration about the pace of policy implementation is understandable, abandoning merit-based appointments in favour of patronage will not magically remove such challenges.
Impulsive calls for politicisation distract from the urgent need for joint reform efforts between Parliament and the Civil Service. Rather than engage in a media battle accusing each other of violating the British constitution, both sides should prioritise sorting out their conflicted accountabilities. Establishing a new statute for the civil service could address the current uncertainties and dysfunctions, serving the interests of both parties while simultaneously allowing them to retain their majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutional structures. In turn, preserving the benefits that come with such an arrangement. One such avenue for this is special advisors: temporary ministerial appointees unbeholden to the Civil Service’s requirement for impartiality. Easing restrictions on the number of special advisors would allow for many of the benefits of politicisation without jeopardising the Civil Service’s impartiality (White, 2023).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the debate over the politicisation of the Civil Service is a complex and nuanced issue requiring careful consideration of its historical roots, current practices, and potential consequences. While advocates of politicisation argue for a more direct connection between ministers and civil servants, evidence suggests maintaining the Civil Service’s impartiality is essential for the well-being of British society.
The historical foundation of the Civil Service emphasises the importance of merit-based appointments to ensure competence and expertise. Impartiality fosters long-term policy consistency, allowing the Civil Service to seize opportunities overlooked in a politicised environment. Furthermore, impartiality enhances public trust in the Civil Service, which is crucial for a government seeking to serve the diverse interests of its citizens.
While the Civil Service has its issues, the proposed solution of politicisation raises concerns about the potential erosion of merit-based appointments, policy consistency, and public trust. Rather than hastily embracing politicisation, a more thoughtful approach involves joint reform efforts between Parliament and the Civil Service. In this regard, special advisors offer a compromise which preserves the benefits of majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutional structures.
In many ways, the Civil Service represents the UK’s meritocratic aspirations, to which forgoing impartiality would be a disservice. Instead, the imperative lies in fostering collaboration and reform to address the challenges within the Civil Service, maintaining its crucial role as an impartial, competent, and trusted institution serving the best interests of the British public.
References
Allen, C., 2021. Islamophobia in the Conservative party: key points from the inquiry on discrimination, Melbourne: The Conversation.
Azam, S. E. & Abdullah, M. A., 2020. Global Halal Industry: Realities and Opportunities. International Journal of Islamic Business Ethics, 5(1), pp. 47-59.
Civil Service, 2010. The Civil Service Code, London: Civil Service.
Civil Service, 2016. Civil Service Management Code, London: Civil Service.
Coolican, M., 2018. No Tradesmen and No Women: The Origins of the British Civil Service. Hull: Biteback Publishing.
Department for Business & Trade, 2023. Annual Report and Accounts 2022-23, London: Department for Business & Trade.
Foster, M., 2016. Civil service performance management: survey highlights leaders’ frustrations, London: Civil Service World.
Friedman, S., 2021. Navigating the labyrinth: Socio-economic background and career progression within the Civil Service, London: Social Mobility Commission.
Hay, C., 2007. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Heffer, S., 2013. High Minds: The Victorians and the Birth of Modern Britain, London: Random House.
HM Revenue & Customs, 2023. National Statistics: UK overseas trade in goods statistics March 2023: commentary, London: HM Revenue & Customs.
Hymas, C. & Malnick, E., 2023. Sack top civil servants who obstruct immigration policies, says Liam Fox, London: The Telegraph.
Majone, G., 2001. Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157(1), pp. 57-78.
National Bureau of Statistics, 2023. Foreign Trade in Goods Statistics (Q1 2023), Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics.
Northcote, S. H. & Trevelyan, C., 1854. Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, Together with a Letter from the Rev. B. Jowett, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.
Thatcher, M. & Sweet, A. S., 2002. Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions. West European Politics, 25(1), pp. 1-22.
Wheeler, B., 2023. Suella Braverman: Civil servants demand apology over small boats email, London: BBC.
White, H., 2023. Civil service politicisation is the wrong answer to the wrong question, London: Institute for Government.
Zürn, M., 2019. Politicization compared: at national, European, and global levels. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(7), pp. 977-995.
Disabled people still face significant barriers in the workplace.
Liz Johnson, co-founder of The Ability People, sheds light on the disability employment gap.
According to a recent government report, the disability employment gap stands at 28.9%, suggesting disabled people still face barriers to employment despite legislation necessitating employers to make reasonable adjustments. To get to the bottom of this, I spoke to Paralympian Gold Medallist Liz Johnson to shed some light on the disability employment gap.
Born with cerebral palsy, Johnson has had a fruitful career as a professional swimmer, winning gold at the 2008 Beijing Paralympics. After retiring from professional swimming, Johnson went into broadcasting, presenting for Channel 4’s coverage of the 2016 and 2020 Paralympic Games. In 2018, Johnson was on the BBC’s 100 Women List after co-founding The Ability People, the UK’s first disability-led inclusion consultancy firm. In the years since, The Ability People has gone on to provide services for companies including HSBC, Chelsea F.C. and IMG.
A 2023 report by the Department for Work & Pensions revealed the employment rate among disabled people stood at 53.6% compared to 82.5% for non-disabled people. This disparity in employment rates is known as the disability employment gap, and it has been a persistent feature of the UK’s labour market despite the 2010 Equality Act making disability discrimination unlawful.
This raises the question: why are organisations still failing to employ disabled people?
According to Johnson, the main barrier to employment is organisations’ lack of exposure to disability. “[Organisations] put the effort in, but they put it in the wrong areas.” For instance, one of The Ability People’s clients had spent numerous resources updating their office to make it more accessible, yet still failed to hire disabled employees. As it turned out, it wasn’t the client’s office which was the problem, but the client’s recruitment process; “[It] hadn’t been updated or amended to be inclusive of the different needs at selection level or even attraction level.” As a result, disabled candidates were unintentionally filtered out of the recruitment process.
As Johnson explains, the key to solving the disability employment gap lies in disability-specific inclusion training that exposes organisations to the diverse needs of disabled people in various contexts. Doing so will allow them to develop robust processes that accommodate and attract disabled talent rather than filter it out. However, she also emphasises that such training is a form of “development and investment” rather than “fixing a problem.”
Ultimately, while society still has a long way to go, Johnson makes clear the onus is on organisations to educate themselves. “It’s not your fault that you don’t know, but ignorance isn’t an excuse. It’s a reason, but it’s not an excuse […] If you don’t know, go and consult the right people […] Otherwise, that becomes a burden for the person who’s being excluded.”
The September 11 Attacks sparked global outrage and prompted the US to initiate the War on Terror.
The following essay was originally submitted as an assignment for my university and was graded as a 2:1.
In this essay, I aim to utilise Allen Repko and James Welch’s interdisciplinary approach to examine the global issue of terrorism (Repko & Welch, 2005). First, I will begin by defining terrorism and outlining my specific research questions. Then I will introduce the concept of interdisciplinarity, discussing its advantages and disadvantages. Following this, I will study terrorism in isolation through the lens of social policy, politics, and economics, highlighting how each discipline answers my research questions. To conclude, I will combine these insights to construct a more integrated understanding of terrorism before reflecting on how I found the process of using an interdisciplinary approach.
Defining Terrorism
In the absence of a single internationally agreed-upon definition, the UN minimally defines terrorism as “the intimidation or coercion of populations or governments through the threat or perpetration of violence, causing death, serious injury or the taking of hostages” (United Nations, 2023). Over the last decade, the global death toll from terrorism ranged from 8,200 in 2011 to 44,600 in 2014, averaging 26,000 people a year. In addition, terrorism poses a significant security risk to countries worldwide, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, which accounted for 95% of the deaths caused by terrorism in 2019 (Ritchie, et al., 2022). Given its global nature, it is imperative that scholars become accustomed to studying terrorism in the hopes of finding a sustainable solution. With this in mind, I aim to utilise interdisciplinarity to answer the following research questions:
What are the causes of terrorism?
What is the solution to terrorism?
Introducing Interdisciplinarity
In 1994, Michael Gibbons and his colleagues posited a new theory concerning the production of knowledge. They argued that knowledge production was undergoing a fundamental change at the end of the twentieth century, moving from what they called ‘Mode 1’ to ‘Mode 2’. Mode 1 refers to traditional knowledge generated within discrete disciplines (Gibbons, et al., 1994). A discipline is any self-contained domain of human experience with its own community of experts and distinctive components (Nissani, 1995). Furthermore, disciplines often focus on a specific subject area with their own rules and boundaries (Bridges, 2006). For example, geology is a discipline concerned with studying Earth and other astronomical objects. It has a community of experts known as geologists and distinctive components, such as geophysical surveys and the Theory of Plate Tectonics.
Meanwhile, Mode 2 refers to knowledge generated by different disciplines working together to solve a specific problem via a process known as interdisciplinarity (Gibbons, et al., 1994). Interdisciplinarity can be minimally defined as bringing together the distinctive components of two or more disciplines (Nissani, 1995). More precisely, interdisciplinarity involves integrating and synthesising knowledge and methods from different disciplines (Jensenius, 2012). For instance, environmental science practices interdisciplinarity by synthesising knowledge and methods from geology, ecology, and oceanography. Much of the knowledge generated in environmental science has gone on to inform policy surrounding climate change.
Before discussing the advantages and disadvantages of interdisciplinarity, it is worth noting how it differs from other knowledge production methods, such as multidisciplinarity and cross-disciplinarity. Multidisciplinarity involves different disciplines working together for a common purpose, each drawing on its own body of knowledge (Jensenius, 2012). Thus, unlike interdisciplinary studies, where a single researcher must become acquainted with different disciplines, multidisciplinary studies require a group of researchers to focus on a common issue, viewing it from the perspective of their individual disciplines. This parallel approach to study is considerably less integrative than interdisciplinarity, making it difficult for researchers to consolidate their knowledge and ideas (Borrego & Newswander, 2010).
Similarly, cross-disciplinarity involves engaging with the subject area of one discipline using the methods and knowledge from another (Jensenius, 2012). Therefore, cross-disciplinarity is the least integrative as it does not require researchers to engage with the tools or perspectives of another discipline, only its subject area. Given this, cross-disciplinarity is far less likely to produce any new meaningful insights regarding a particular topic or issue. Therefore, both multidisciplinarity and cross-disciplinarity fall short of interdisciplinarity when it comes to successful knowledge production.
The benefits and challenges of interdisciplinarity are best encapsulated by the term ‘breadth-over-depth’. If the different knowledge production methods were to exist on a spectrum, then traditional disciplinarity would have the most depth and least breadth, followed by cross-disciplinarity and multidisciplinarity. Interdisciplinarity exists on the other side of the spectrum with the most breadth but least depth. Accordingly, traditional disciplinarity is often characterised as having a narrow focus that poses an “obstacle to fluid and imaginative intellectual endeavour” (Bridges, 2006, p. 262). Meanwhile, interdisciplinary studies come across as “characteristically shallow” (Benson, 1982, p. 43).
The main challenge of using an interdisciplinary approach is limited time and resources. Traditional disciplinarity allows students and researchers to pool all their time and resources into a single subject, allowing for greater mastery over their chosen discipline. In contrast, interdisciplinarity requires students and researchers to divide their time and resources across multiple disciplines, preventing them from fully understanding any one discipline. Interdisciplinary research projects have significantly longer production times and increased ambiguity compared to traditional research projects. Consequently, interdisciplinary studies tend to receive limited recognition and support within traditional academic structures (Leahey, 2018). Therefore, interdisciplinarity is the least efficient method of knowledge production.
On the other hand, the main benefit of an interdisciplinary approach is its ability to recognise the multifaceted nature of complex global issues such as terrorism. Using a single discipline to address a global issue will only highlight the elements that are relevant to that discipline. For instance, strict economists will only notice the economic causes of terrorism, leading them to wrongly conclude that terrorism is solely the result of economic deprivation. Therefore, traditional disciplinarity is insufficient when addressing global issues (Okamura, 2019). However, interdisciplinarity encourages individuals to critically engage with the theories and methodologies of multiple disciplines, opening them up to fresh perspectives whilst simultaneously overcoming the inadequacies of any one discipline (Klein, 1990). Furthermore, interdisciplinary learning has the added benefit of developing advanced epistemological beliefs, metacognitive skills, creativity, and critical thinking (Stentoft, 2017). Thus, making it the ideal method for effectively addressing global issues.
In summary, the future of knowledge production lies in interdisciplinarity – the integration and synthesis of different disciplines – as opposed to multidisciplinarity and cross-disciplinarity. While interdisciplinary approaches may not be as efficient as traditional disciplinary approaches, they are more effective at addressing complex global issues. Accordingly, an interdisciplinary approach is crucial for highlighting the multiplicity of factors causing terrorism which is conducive to devising a viable solution that covers all bases.
Perspectives from Social Policy
Over the last two decades, social policy has become increasingly invested in the study of terrorism and how it relates to issues surrounding social welfare. Primarily drawing from the discipline of criminology, social policy recognises that terrorism has changed over time. In recent years, a growing number of social policy practitioners have begun distinguishing between what they term ‘old’ terrorism and ‘new’ terrorism.
According to David Rapoport, the history of modern terrorism can be divided into four waves: anarchist, nationalist/anti-colonial, new left, and religious (Rapoport, 2004). Each of these four waves of terrorism is characterised by unique socio-cultural environments, methodologies, ideologies, and organisational structures. For instance, the current religious wave, exemplified by Al-Qaeda, directly appeals to religious faith for its justification, whereas the nationalist wave, exemplified by the IRA, appealed to ideas about emancipatory struggle (Kaplan, 2016). Rapoport’s religious wave of terrorism coincides with what social policy practitioners call ‘new’ terrorism: the “anti-order of the new world order of the 21st century” (Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 158). It is characterised by amorphous structures of organisation and indiscriminate violent spectacles inspired by religious extremism (Hattotuwa, 2007). Given these conclusions, it is clear that social policy views religious fanaticism as a major cause of modern terrorism. That being said, a growing minority of scholars have begun categorising a fifth wave of terrorism, the right-wing wave, centred around ideas about white supremacy (Auger, 2020).
In social policy, the purpose of terrorism studies is to determine how much of a threat it poses to social welfare. In the UK, this has spurred policymakers to create the UK Terror Threat Levels, a scale of five alert states ranging from low to critical that determine national security responses. Since its introduction in 2006, the UK threat level from international terrorism has not dropped below substantial (MI5, 2023). This is but a reflection of much greater anxiety and moral panic surrounding the threat of terrorism on a global scale that has pushed policymakers worldwide to devise increasingly authoritarian measures to address it via a process known as securitisation.
Securitisation refers to the state’s ability to transform common political issues into matters of national security, allowing it to pass extraordinary measures it would not be able to do otherwise (Buzan, et al., 1998). It is a practice that dates back to the early waves of terrorism when colonial powers instituted increasingly draconian methods in an attempt to stem the tide of nationalistic fervour. For example, the British Raj passed the Defence of India Act 1915, extending it under the Rowlatt Act in 1919, which allowed for the censorship of the press, arrests without warrant, indefinite detention without trial, and juryless trials for anyone engaged in acts of revolutionary nationalism (Ghani, 2020).
In a similar fashion, the UK government gradually rolled back on the public’s civil liberties in the interest of national security during the early 2000s. The Terrorism Act 2000 gave the police the power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion. A few years later, the Terrorism Act 2006 gave the police the power to arrest and detain without charge for up to 28 days. These powers have subsequently been abused by police, especially when shutting down political dissent. For example, in March 2003, anti-war protestors were prevented from protesting outside RAF Fairford and were sent back to London under heavy police escort (BBC, 2013). Furthermore, in June 2013, documents leaked by Edward Snowden revealed that GCHQ had been spying on the British public (Amnesty International UK, 2020). This practice of mass surveillance has since been formalised under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which gave 48 state authorities, including GCHQ, the power to access the general public’s internet connection records without a warrant.
Alongside this general erosion of civil liberties, the UK government has also begun implementing special measures targeting specific suspect communities, most notably British Muslims. Introduced in 2011, the Prevent programme has since faced considerable criticism for its “negative and discriminatory effects on Muslim communities” (Nezirevic, 2022). Most notably, Prevent has been found to be inherently Islamophobic, contributing to the marginalisation of the Muslim community, which only increases the risk of radicalisation (Holmwood & Aitlhadj, 2022). Despite specifically targeting Muslim communities, the Prevent programme still failed to stop Salman Abedi from committing the 2017 Manchester Arena Bombing (Perraudin, 2017). Therefore, much like the Rowlatt Act of 1919, modern UK government policy has proven ineffective in addressing terrorism, in many ways exacerbating the very conditions that lead to radicalisation.
In summary, social policy firmly places religion, particularly Islam, at the heart of modern terrorism. This, in turn, has fuelled moral panic, allowing governments to implement increasingly authoritarian laws that cut back on individual liberty. In doing so, governments have contributed to the very same socio-economic conditions that allow for the radicalisation of individuals.
Perspectives from Politics
Since the War on Terror began, terrorism has become an increasingly popular area of research in political science, particularly where its subdisciplines of international relations, security studies and strategic studies are concerned. Consequently, numerous studies have been conducted on the causes of terrorism. Overall, political science recognises three main categories of factors that cause or exacerbate modern terrorism: ideological factors, socio-economic factors, and psychological factors (Wojciechowski, 2017).
Terrorists identify with ideologies centred around ideas regarding politics, ethnicity, and religion. Broadly speaking, terrorists fall into two categories: nationalists and ideologists (Segaller, 1987). Nationalists are radicalised by perceived national injustices and supported by their communities, utilising violent means where peaceful means have proven ineffective. For example, the IRA sought to free Ireland from British colonial rule. Meanwhile, ideologists hold distinctly minority views and are often ostracised from their communities. For example, ISIS follows a very extreme interpretation of Islam that is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims.
For terrorism to thrive, it requires socio-economic conditions that generate and intensify radical attitudes. While experts disagree on the importance of specific socio-economic conditions, globalisation stands out as a critical factor underpinning modern terrorism. Globalisation threatens local communities’ societal norms and economic position, leading to intercultural conflict, particularly in the global ‘south’ (Stevens, 2002). In addition, globalisation has brought into stark focus the development disparity between the rich global ‘north’ and the poor global ‘south’. As it stands, less-developed states experience the greatest threat from terrorist activity (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022). Furthermore, terrorist organisations rely on financial backing from various international sources, from individual donors to foreign regimes. For example, the Afghan Taliban relies on donations from sympathisers abroad and the opium trade to fund its activities (Clarke, 2015). I will elaborate on the financial aspect of terrorism in the economics section of this essay.
People at risk of being radicalised by terrorist groups exhibit certain psychological processes such as hatred, prejudice, injustice, and trauma, among others. This is evidenced by the fact that many terrorists follow some variation of the ‘us versus them’ mentality. For example, Brenton Tarrant was influenced by anti-Muslim sentiment and white supremacy, leading him to commit the 2019 Christchurch Mosque Shootings (Ehsan & Stott, 2020). Another commonality amongst terrorist groups is the idea that everything, including one’s life, comes second to ‘the cause’. As a result, terrorists willingly assume responsibility for and engage in violently destructive activities (Horgan, 2003).
Given its vast range of causal factors, political scientists have advocated for different solutions to address terrorism, depending on their ontological and epistemological positions. The most popular position is that of the realists who call for direct military intervention in countries facing terrorist threats. For instance, following the September 11th Attacks, the USA launched its War on Terror, increasing its global military presence, particularly in the Middle East. As of 2021, the USA controls around 750 overseas military bases (Vine, 2021). Despite eliminating high-value targets like Osama Bin Laden, the USA’s War on Terror is often considered a strategic failure. During the Arab Spring, the USA failed to protect its strategic allies, such as Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was deposed in 2012 (Riedel, 2017). After the USA’s withdrawal in late 2021, the Taliban effectively took over Afghanistan, demonstrating how twenty years of military intervention proved ineffective at addressing terrorism (Center for Preventive Action, 2022). Not to mention the 387,072 civilian deaths caused by the USA’s post-9/11 wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, and Pakistan (Watson Institute, 2021). As a result of this fervent interventionism, many countries belonging to the global ‘south’ view the USA and its allies with suspicion (Simon & Stevenson, 2015).
In response to the War on Terror’s strategic failure, post-modernists have begun to question how society perceives terrorism. As academics have increasingly highlighted, western media outlets consistently associate terrorism with Islam and Muslims (Scrivens, 2018). Atrocities committed by Islamist extremists receive six times more coverage and are nine times more likely to be associated with the term ‘terrorism’ than those committed by far-right extremists despite using similar methods of violence (Hanif, 2020). This failure to frame far-right extremism as terrorism is reflected in the lack of adequate policy measures to address it. Furthermore, associating Islam with terrorism has prompted anti-Muslim sentiment worldwide, fuelling justification for state-sponsored aggression towards Muslim minorities (Werleman, 2021). This only further marginalises Muslim populations, creating the socio-economic conditions that precipitate terrorist activity. Therefore, post-modernists assert that the way the international community currently frames terrorism is detrimental to the process of solving it.
To summarise, political science asserts that terrorism results from various ideological, socio-economic, and psychological factors. Following the failure of the USA’s War on Terror, the mainstream realist advocacy for direct military intervention has been increasingly questioned, prompting post-modernists to call for a revaluation of terrorism discourse.
Perspectives from Economics
In economics, terrorism is primarily studied from a utility perspective, analysing the rational choices of terrorist organisations. Hence, economists make no distinction between terrorists and other criminals. Therefore, to understand the root cause of terrorism, one must familiarise themselves with the economic theory of crime.
Initially conceived by Jeremy Bentham in 1789, the economic theory of crime was later formalised by Gary Becker in 1968. According to Bentham, “the profit of the crime urges a man to delinquency: the pain of punishment is the force employed to restrain him from it”. Furthermore, “if the first of these forces be the greater, the crime will be committed; if the second, the crime will not be committed” (Bentham, 1789, p. 399). Similarly, in Becker’s model, criminal acts are preferred when the expected benefits of a crime exceed its expected costs, including the costs of any foregone legal alternatives (Becker, 1968). Thus, criminals are presented as rational utility maximisers. In the case of terrorism, this is no different: terrorists aim to maximise their utility. For instance, the Taliban still exported opium to the USA despite fighting a war against them, as it was the course of action that maximised their utility (Clarke, 2015).
One of the main conclusions drawn from the economic theory of crime is the idea that poverty breeds crime. According to the theory, criminals wish to engage in criminal activities that provide a benefit exceeding the benefit they would receive engaging in legal activities (Becker, 1968). Therefore, the lower an individual’s legal income, the more likely they are to engage in crime or terrorism. This is clearly reflected in the fact that less-developed, low-income countries experience greater levels of terrorist activity (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022). Furthermore, during the onset of the 2007-2008 Financial crisis, the number of terrorist attacks worldwide reached an all-time high of 14,414 (Statista Research Department, 2023). Given this, economists generally believe that the solution to terrorism – as with all things – lies in economic growth. However, economists disagree on how to bring about said economic growth and are broadly divided into two schools of economic philosophy: Keynesian economics and laissez-faire economics.
Named after its founder John Keynes, the Keynesian school of economics asserts that a healthy economy is the result of private sector and government help. Therefore, it falls to governments to implement the appropriate monetary and fiscal policies to maintain high aggregate demand, avoiding unemployment and economic recessions (The Investopedia Team, 2022). According to Keynes, an economy’s output is the sum of consumption, investment, government expenditure, and net exports. Therefore, any increase in one of these components leads to an increase in output, leading to an increase in aggregate demand. In addition, Keynesian economic models also include a multiplier effect, so any change in output is a multiple of the increase or decrease in spending that caused the change (Jahan, et al., 2014). Keynesian economists typically advocate for higher social spending, lower taxes, and lower interest rates during economic recessions and the opposite during economic booms (The Investopedia Team, 2022).
On the other hand, the laissez-faire school of economics rejects government intervention, preferring to let the free market naturally regulate itself. Laissez-faire economists believe economic competition constitutes a natural order, the best type of economic regulation (The Investopedia Team, 2022). Take, for example, the theory of comparative advantage, which refers to a country’s ability to produce goods and services at a lower opportunity cost than its trade partners. In a global free market economy, every country would be forced to specialise in whichever industry they have a comparative advantage and trade in whichever industry they lack a comparative advantage. In theory, doing so would increase global productivity and economic growth (The Economist, 1998). As a result, laissez-faire economists are typically against minimum wages, trade restrictions, and corporate taxes, viewing them as penalties on production. Therefore, governments should only intervene to preserve property, life, and individual freedom, allowing ‘the invisible hand’ to proceed unhindered (The Investopedia Team, 2022).
In summary, economics solely recognises poverty as the driving force behind terrorism and other crimes. Therefore, the solution to terrorism lies in increased economic growth that alleviates poverty, thereby removing the incentive to engage in criminal activity. Laissez-faire economic policies have classically led to meagre wages, unsafe working conditions, significant wealth gaps and other socio-economic conditions that breed crime and terrorism. Meanwhile, Keynesian economists seek to solve terrorism by addressing market inequalities and reducing the economic marginalisation that pushes individuals to commit acts of terror.
Conclusion
In conclusion, interdisciplinarity is the most appropriate method for addressing any multifaceted global issue, such as terrorism, given its inherent appreciation for different disciplinary viewpoints. As far as social policy, politics, and economics are concerned, each discipline recognises different causes and solutions to the problem of terrorism. Therefore, it falls to interdisciplinarity to synthesise these various viewpoints to devise a viable solution to terrorism.
To devise a solution, we must first understand the causes of terrorism. Of the three disciplines examined in this essay, politics has the broadest range of factors contributing to the issue of terrorism: ideological factors, socio-economic factors, and psychological factors. Meanwhile, social policy and economics place more emphasis on religious extremism (an ideological factor) and poverty (a socio-economic factor), respectively. Regardless, all three disciplines recognise social and economic marginalisation as a critical factor behind radicalisation. Therefore, any attempt to solve terrorism must address the factors contributing to marginalisation.
As discussed in social policy, UK government policy has contributed to the social marginalisation of the Muslim community. Similarly, on a wider scale, the western media often demonises Muslims as the sole perpetrators of terrorist activity. Therefore, as highlighted in politics, there is a desperate need to change the way terrorism and Islam are framed as social discourses. To do this, I would recommend that media outlets begin reporting more fairly on terrorist activities committed by non-Muslim groups such as the far-right. Furthermore, media outlets should also portray Muslims in a more positive light to counteract the decades of negative stereotypes which have fuelled anti-Muslim sentiment. In addition, economics has highlighted a need for reduced wealth inequality and increased economic growth to deter terrorism. To achieve this, I suggest governments invest more money into communities at risk of radicalisation.
Overall, using an interdisciplinary approach has proven to be both a challenging and informative experience. While it has equipped me with a broad range of knowledge, I do not feel I am particularly well-versed in any one of the disciplines studied in this essay. Furthermore, the time constraints of this particular project meant that I could not devise a fully-fledged solution to the problem of terrorism. I am sure I could devise a much better solution if I had more time and resources. Thus, my experience with interdisciplinarity reflects the primary issue associated with the approach: ‘breadth-over-depth’.
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Formal relations between Pakistan and China date back to 1950, when Pakistan became one of the first countries to recognise the People’s Republic of China.
The following report was originally submitted as part of my A-level EPQ – for which I received an A* – and was completed in February 2020. Therefore, some of the information may be outdated. Regardless, I hope it proves informative for anyone interested in Sino-Pak relations.
The Spatial Layout of CPEC
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is perhaps one of the world’s largest infrastructure overhauls seen in the last decade. It is comprised of 70 projects, ranging from coal-fired power plants to fibre optic cables, and is currently worth over $62 billion in Chinese investment (Ministry of Planning and Development, 2019; Siddiqui, 2017).
CPEC is the flagship for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global development strategy similar to the US Marshall Plan. It marks the beginning of a new venture in Sino-Pak relations, which already has a strong military and political base. The aim: to ensure sustained economic growth for both Pakistan and China’s western region of Xinjiang.
However, the question must be asked: Is CPEC good for Pakistan?
By this, I mean, is CPEC good for Pakistan economically and politically? This is an important question considering Pakistan’s history as a client state to foreign powers such as the US and Saudi Arabia. These relationships have plunged Pakistan into over $82.19 billion of external debt, with 29.5% of its population below the poverty line (CIA, 2019).
In addition, Pakistan’s involvement in the US War on Terror claimed the lives of over 23,375 Pakistani civilians while leaving the country with several terrorist organisations to deal with (Al-Jazeera, 2018). Meanwhile, corrupt Pakistani officials hoard money in overseas bank accounts while the poor suffer from a crippling economy. It is no wonder we should be concerned with the recent developments concerning Pakistan’s newfound love for China.
Will CPEC break or reinforce the status quo?
That being said, CPEC doesn’t just affect Pakistan; it could have implications for the whole world. Pakistan is located in one of the world’s most strategically important locations. The Indus River has always been the crossroads between civilisations and ruled by great powers such as the Achaemenid Empire, Alexander’s Macedonian Empire, the Mongols, the Mughals and, most recently, the British Raj.
Today, Pakistan borders two of the world’s fastest-growing economies: India and China, not to mention the oil-rich Middle East and mineral-rich Afghanistan. With the Strait of Hormuz only 600km from Gwadar port and direct access to the Arabian Sea, Pakistan will undoubtedly play a crucial role in the global economy with the help of CPEC.
What does CPEC mean for the BRI? And what does the BRI mean for the world and its future?
In this essay, I aim to answer these questions and highlight the steps Pakistan should take to ensure it can get the most out of CPEC.
CPEC Projects
CPEC PROJECTS
CHINESE-FINANCED PROJECTS
Energy
There are currently 17 priority projects, 3 actively promoted projects and 2 potential projects related to generating and transmitting electricity. These include coal-fired power plants, wind farms, solar parks, transmission lines, and hydropower. The projects are estimated to cost more than $20 billion, with a combined power capacity of around 12.5 GW.
Infrastructure
There are currently 5 road projects financed by China, including the Peshawar-Karachi motorway, alongside 3 rail projects, including expanding and reconstructing the existing ML-1 line between Peshawar and Karachi, essentially connecting north to south. These projects are estimated to cost more than $12 billion.
Gwadar
A total of around $1 billion is to be invested into the BRI’s flagship project, Gwadar on the coast of Pakistan’s Balochistan province, in the form of: – Gwadar East-Bay Expressway. – New Gwadar International Airport. – Construction of breakwaters. – Dredging of berthing areas and channels. – Development of Free Zone. – Water treatment, supply and distribution facilities. – Pak-China Friendship Hospital. – Pak-China Technical and Vocational Institute at Gwadar. – Gwadar Smart Port City Master Plan.
Rail-Based Mass Transit
There are currently 4 mass transit projects in the works, of which 2 are undergoing feasibility studies, and 1 has a completed feasibility study. The final project, Lahore’s Orange Line, is currently under construction and is estimated to cost around $1.6 billion.
Provincial
A total of 6 provincial-level projects, including a seaport, 3 roads, a canal and an iron ore mining, processing, and steel mills complex, are currently in the early planning phases.
SEZs
There are a total of 9 proposed SEZs throughout Pakistan. None of which are currently underway.
Social Sector Development
Alongside the various infrastructure projects, CPEC will also include the following: – People-to-people exchanges. – Transfer of knowledge in different sectors. – Establishment of the Pakistan Academy of Social Sciences. – Transfer of knowledge in the education sector through a consortium of business schools.
Technology
A cross-border optical fibre cable was inaugurated in 2018 and cost $37.4 million. A pilot project for Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast is currently in its planning stages and is estimated to cost around $4 million.
PSDP PROJECTS
Western Route Projects
There are a total of 6 motorway projects taking place in western Pakistan. Currently, 3 are in the early stages of development, 1 is under construction, and 2 have been completed. The total cost of all the projects is estimated to be around $2 billion.
Are SEZs Good for Pakistan?
Location of CPEC SEZs
CPEC is going to see many changes to the Pakistani economy. In particular, under CPEC, Pakistan will introduce new Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These are areas where business and trade laws differ from the rest of the country.
China is helping Pakistan establish a total of 9 SEZs, most likely based on the Chinese model, such as Shenzhen in the Guangdong province and Kashgar in Xinjiang (Ministry of Planning and Development, 2019). Chinese SEZs are export-oriented and primarily driven by market forces. They give special tax incentives for foreign investment and have greater independence from the central government on international trade activities. Furthermore, Chinese SEZs are listed separately in national planning and retain the authority to pass legislation. This gives SEZs the same power as provincial-level administrations regarding economic policy.
Proponents of CPEC put forward the idea that SEZs will bring about economic growth by liberalising the Pakistani economy via increased exports and foreign direct investment.
If there is one proposition with which virtually all economists agree, it is that free trade is almost always better than protection.
The Economist Why trade is good for you
This is based on the theory of comparative advantage (a country’s ability to produce goods and services at a lower opportunity cost than its trade partners). In short, by liberalising the Pakistani economy, Pakistan will be better off. This is because it will naturally force Pakistan to specialise in whichever industries it has a comparative advantage, such as raw cotton. Overall, this would increase Pakistan’s output in those industries, leading to increased exports and economic growth as a result.
Pakistan would then be obligated to increase trade in whichever industries it lacks a comparative advantage, such as dairy products. This will allow other countries to specialise in whichever industries they have a comparative advantage while trading with Pakistan in whichever industry they lack a comparative advantage. Theoretically, this would increase world output and, by extension, economic growth for all countries (The Economist, 1998).
In China, following the establishment of its first SEZs in 1980 and various economic reforms designed to open up the country to global trade, GDP skyrocketed from $191 billion (1980) to $1.2 trillion (2000) and eventually $13.6 trillion (2018) (World Bank, 2019). China is a textbook case study of how market liberalisation can significantly transform a country’s economic position.
If Pakistan learns from China, there is no reason the country would not also achieve long-term economic growth. Furthermore, the CPEC proposed SEZs are said to have the potential to generate over half a million direct jobs and over a million indirect jobs in Pakistan (Malik, 2019).
However, as seen in the case of the Kingston Free Zone in Jamaica, free trade is not always conducive to the betterment of a country’s citizens. In the 1980s, Jamaican citizens were forced to work in poor conditions on low wages for foreign companies that were not legally required to operate according to government standards.
SEZs worldwide have been responsible for the rampant exploitation of workers and loss of government revenue. Other negative socio-economic impacts include suppressing labour rights, preventing trade unionisation, and poor environmental standards. Evidently, without proper government regulation, the SEZs proposed by CPEC can potentially exacerbate existing problems concerning Pakistani labour. This, in turn, could have severe social and political implications for Pakistan, which already has the third-largest number of people trapped in modern-day slavery at 3.19 million after China and India (Reuters, 2018).
Will CPEC End Pakistan’s Energy Insecurity?
One major obstacle to Pakistan’s economic success is the country’s poor energy provision. Pakistan currently ranks 115 out of 137 countries for reliable electricity, with only 70.8% of the country’s population having access to electricity, leaving over 52 million people without access (CIA, 2019; World Bank, 2019).
Private sector investors see the lack of reliable electricity as a potential risk to profit. And rightly so; in 2015 alone, power sector inefficiencies cost the Pakistani economy $18 billion (6.5% of GDP) (World Bank, 2018). Couple this with the associated social implications, such as increased strain on healthcare and lower quality of education, and you have a recipe for disaster.
When you compare this to the rapidly emerging economy of China, where access to electricity is at 100%, it is clear to see the importance of a reliable energy supply in developing a strong economy (World Bank, 2019). By introducing energy reforms, Pakistan could save $8.4 billion in business losses and increase total household incomes by at least $4.8 billion annually (World Bank, 2018).
Proponents of CPEC claim it will fulfil the electricity demand and ensure the reliability of electricity supply in Pakistan. After all, CPEC includes a total of 22 projects dedicated to energy generation and supply, which, when combined, offer a power capacity of 12.4 GW (Ministry of Planning and Development, 2019). When this is added to Pakistan’s current installed power capacity of 30 GW, there will be more than enough energy to overcome Pakistan’s deficit of 5 GW (Energypedia, 2019). Therefore, in theory, CPEC will fulfil Pakistan’s energy demands and leave room for demand to increase, which is crucial for long-term economic growth.
However, the question remains: does it work in practice?
Of the 22 energy projects, only 8 are fully operational, leaving a significant energy deficit from a lack of power capacity (Ministry of Planning and Development, 2019). Furthermore, transmission inefficiencies frequently lead to blackouts across the country. Pakistan’s transmission capacity sits at 22 GW, well below the country’s current installed power capacity (Rehman, 2018). This slow progress meant CPEC did not achieve its 2020 goal of addressing the bottlenecks in the country’s economic and social development (Ministry of Planning and Development, 2017).
In other words, CPEC has already failed to achieve 100% energy access by its own deadline of 2020. If the country cannot even provide enough electricity for its people, how will it provide enough energy for the second phase of CPEC? Therefore, in practice, CPEC has failed to fulfil its own goals, let alone the electricity demand of Pakistan.
In due course, these projects will be completed. However, if they are to be completed in the same timeframe as CPEC’s second and third-phase projects, there will be dire consequences for the Pakistani economy. Without sufficient energy provision, Pakistan will have to increase energy imports to complete its second and third-phase projects, such as the New Gwadar International Airport, which began construction in October 2019.
This will increase the country’s current account deficit, as seen with the ‘Punjab Speed’ predicament (Rafiq, 2019). As a result, the Pakistani rupee will be devalued yet again, and annual growth will continue to slow. Pakistan will then be forced to seek another bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other countries like China.
Even if all the energy projects are completed, they will become obsolete over the long term. Of the 12.4 GW provided by CPEC, 8.2 GW are coal-based (Ministry of Planning and Development, 2019). The negative impacts of burning coal are widely documented. Pakistan is a country with four major cities (Peshawar, Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi) with air quality rankings ranging from unhealthy to hazardous (AQI, 2019). Is it wise to invest in coal-fired power plants? While coal is more reliable and efficient, it will not last forever.
Once Pakistan exhausts its domestic supply of Thar coal, it will have to import coal from abroad, most likely from China. Pakistan already depends on Saudi Arabia and Iran for oil and gas, making up 80% of its energy mix (Energypedia, 2019). Add China to the mix, and Pakistan will become even more vulnerable to the influence of foreign powers and the fluctuating prices of fossil fuels. This is ultimately counter-productive to achieving sustainable long-term economic growth for Pakistan.
Is CPEC a Debt Trap?
Pakistan’s debt crisis has significantly impeded the country’s development.
Another major issue afflicting Pakistan’s economy is the ongoing debt crisis. Since the establishment of CPEC, Pakistan’s total external debt has increased from around $60 billion (2013) to over $90 billion (2018). However, it is important to note CPEC itself did not cause the debt crisis.
As Pakistan accumulates more debt, the country will have to use more money to service debt in the future. Between 2017 and 2018, Pakistan serviced $7.5 billion of debt, of which $2.3 billion was interest. Due to the increasing issue of debt servicing, the current account deficit increased from $18 billion (2017) to $21 billion (2018) (Rehman & Tahir, 2019).
Furthermore, due to the interest of such debt having reached a high level, Pakistan has had to borrow more money to repay its obligations. Despite declaring he would rather die than go to the IMF seeking a bailout, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan was forced to turn to the IMF for $6 billion in the face of a weak economy, making it the 12th time Pakistan has had to rely on the IMF (Bokhari & Findlay, 2019).
Pakistan is in the midst of a perpetual cycle of debt, which must be addressed if the country ever wants sustainable long-term economic growth. Will CPEC exacerbate or relieve the debt crisis?
Proponents of CPEC are often quick to point out the insignificance of Pakistan’s external debt to China, which is currently around $6 billion, less than 6% of Pakistan’s total external debt (Khawar, 2019). In fact, the majority of Pakistan’s external debt is owed to multilateral lenders such as the IMF and the World Bank (Masood, 2019). However, nobody calls these organisations a ‘debt trap’ despite having plunged many more developing economies into debt than China.
On the contrary, CPEC offers increased trade, allowing the country to repay its debt in the long term. Pakistan is forecasted to collect between $6 billion to $8 billion from CPEC toll taxes and rental fees, with 4% of China’s total trade ($154 billion according to 2015 figures) passing through CPEC (Rafiq, 2017). Other lenders do not offer this, making the debt from China less of a burden as CPEC provides the funds to pay it back.
On the other hand, Pakistan is one of 8 countries of particular concern regarding the risk of debt distress (Kugelman, 2019; Rolland, 2019). Furthermore, China has been charging Pakistan interest rates as high as 5% compared to the 2% to 2.5% rate given to other BRI countries (Hurley, et al., 2018). Due to the high cost of electricity and transmission losses, Pakistan would also have to pay Chinese companies for electricity Pakistani distribution companies cannot afford, resulting in a currency crisis as Chinese companies move money outside the country.
In addition, an increase in CPEC-related imports combined with decreasing exports, as the Pakistani market is flooded with Chinese products, could push the country further into a currency crisis. Therefore, it is fair to say while CPEC represents an opportunity for Pakistan to end the debt crisis, it also poses a risk of falling even deeper into it.
There is also the concern that if Pakistan cannot repay Chinese loans, China may begin seizing assets as it did with Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka (Kugelman, 2019). Thereby compromising Pakistan’s sovereignty and robbing the country of potential revenue. However, the likelihood of this occurring is very slim.
China’s Debt Renegotiations
A study by the US-based Rhodium Group found most of China’s debt renegotiations end with the debt being completely written off (Kratz, et al., 2019). Furthermore, China’s long-standing political and military relationship with Pakistan, which saw the joint development of the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet, Al-Khalid tank and Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, makes asset seizure all the more unlikely for Pakistan.
If Pakistan can utilise CPEC and policy reforms to increase exports, there is no reason why the debt crisis cannot be solved in the long term. Therefore, the argument that CPEC is a ‘debt trap’ is not entirely fair. CPEC itself did not cause the debt crisis. CPEC itself will not exacerbate the debt crisis. CPEC itself will not even relieve the debt crisis. To pin all the responsibility on CPEC is neither fair nor well-grounded. It is, in fact, Pakistan’s own economic policy that will determine whether the country remains in debt, not CPEC.
Does CPEC Favour Punjab?
Since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, the country’s politics have been dominated by the Punjab province. Of Pakistan’s 342 seats in the national assembly, 174 seats are reserved for Punjabi politicians, as Punjab makes up the majority of the country’s population. By dominating the lower house of Pakistan’s parliament and contributing to 57% of the country’s GDP, Punjab has proven itself to be the most influential province of Pakistan (Dawn, 2010).
This has led to controversies in the past. For example, the proposed Kalabagh Dam has been debated for the last 40 years. The project is advocated by Punjab-based power brokers but has been opposed by politicians from the country’s smaller provinces, such as Sindh, which sees the project as a threat to its water security. Therefore, it is a viable concern CPEC may favour Punjab over the other provinces of Pakistan.
Proponents of CPEC tend to claim all Pakistani provinces will benefit equally. Following the 18th amendment to the country’s constitution in 2010, many powers were devolved at the federal level and given to the provinces (Hussain, 2019). It was seen as a step towards democracy, allowing the smaller provinces greater autonomy from the Punjab-dominated centre.
As a result, when it comes to CPEC projects, parliament only provides oversight and is not responsible for coordination and decision-making (Rafiq, 2017). It is down to the provinces to plan and execute projects with China. Therefore, it is argued the notion of CPEC favouring Punjab is a false narrative. Due to the devolved power, all the provinces are in the same boat regarding CPEC.
On the other hand, given the history of Punjab’s dominance politically, economically, and socially compared to the rest of Pakistan, Punjab remains the most equipped and desirable province to absorb investment from China. This has led to two major controversies concerning CPEC’s lack of transparency and alleged favouritism towards Punjab. Despite being resolved, these issues have fuelled an overall distrust of Punjab amongst Pakistan’s other provinces.
The first controversy began in 2014, when politicians from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province began claiming the CPEC route had been shifted from KP towards Punjab, thereby excluding the region from Chinese investment. The original route proposed in 2006 passed through the impoverished areas of Balochistan, southern Punjab and central KP, including the provincial capital of Peshawar (Bengali, et al., 2015; Rafiq, 2017).
Following the rise of the Tehrik-e-Taliban, which grew to threaten most of KP, the route was changed to avoid KP. In response, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) held a dharna to dislodge the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) for electoral fraud with the alleged support of a former Inter-Services Intelligence chief. In 2015, politicians staged a walkout from the Senate. To placate critics, the government proposed CPEC would have three routes (Eastern, Central and Western). By 2017, the issue was resolved. However, the debate may resume should there be another change in government (Schwemlein, 2019).
The second controversy is centred on the Orange Line in Punjab’s capital of Lahore (Rafiq, 2017). When CPEC formally launched in 2015, the mass transit rail line stood out as a municipal project amongst largely intercity and interregional connectivity-focused projects. This led to an outcry amongst the smaller provinces of Pakistan.
No Pakistani city outside Punjab’s jurisdiction, except Islamabad, has a mass transit system. Including it as part of CPEC, despite having to be subsidised at $160 million per year to keep fares affordable, is a clear example of CPEC’s favouritism towards Punjab (Dawn, 2016). Following the controversy, it was asserted that the Orange Line was not part of CPEC; instead, it was a bilateral agreement between the Punjab government and China planned four years prior.
It was not until December 2016, following document leaks confirming the project had been on the CPEC agenda early on, that the Orange Line was formally added to the Planning Commission of Pakistan’s list of CPEC projects (Rafiq, 2017). Following this, additional municipal rail projects were added in Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar to appease the smaller provinces (Ministry of Planning and Development, 2019).
Will Gwadar Port End Baloch Separatism?
Balochistan has proven itself to be a difficult province for the Pakistani leadership to handle. The conflict goes back to 1948, when Kalat, a princely state that used to make up most modern-day Balochistan, acceded to Pakistan. The Khan’s brother opposed the move, and since then, multiple insurgencies have been fought against Pakistan. However, it was not until the latest insurgency following disputes between the Rajiha, a subtribe of the Bugti tribe, and the government over natural gas concessions in 2003 that anything close to a unified Baloch revolt occurred.
By 2013, the insurgency subsided but is still said to be operational in the Awaran region and Makran coast (Rafiq, 2017). With CPEC’s flagship Gwadar port located on the Makran coast, Baloch separatism poses a considerable security risk. Will CPEC placate or provoke the Baloch separatists?
Proponents of CPEC put forward the idea that making Gwadar the focal point of the economic corridor will bring about economic growth and social development for the people of Balochistan. Thereby putting an end to Baloch disenfranchisement and, by extension, the broader anti-Pakistan sentiments fuelling Baloch separatism.
Following the 2013 elections, the PML-N had to form a coalition with the Balochistan National Party (BNP). This nationalist party is pro-Pakistan yet wishes to see more autonomy for Balochistan. By maintaining the support of the BNP, the government has been able to move towards more equitable development through CPEC, thereby avoiding an intensified insurgency. Baloch politicians admire China’s ability to rapidly improve its standard of living and see CPEC as a means to uplift the Baloch people if done right (Rafiq, 2017). Therefore, Gwadar port is the only solution for the Baloch insurgency.
However, the BNP still echoes the view Balochistan should have control of its resources. This view is shared by Baloch separatists and has been central to the historical struggle in the province.
Balochistan is home to over $1 trillion of natural resources; however, despite being so mineral-rich, the region has the lowest human development index (HDI) in Pakistan (Baloch, 2015). Any income generated by these resources has primarily been used for the social development of Pakistan’s other provinces, mainly Punjab, rather than the betterment of Balochistan from whence they came.
With this in mind, the BNP has called on the federal government to hand control of Gwadar port over to the Balochistan provincial government (Dawn, 2015). Unfortunately, the port remains in the hands of Chinese Overseas Port Holdings Limited (South China Morning Post, 2013). This could spell disaster for Pakistan. With Gwadar now in the hands of China, resources are bound to leave not just Balochistan but Pakistan as a whole. Therefore, little to no income generated will ever reach the Baloch people. Social development will continue to stagnate, and anti-Pakistan sentiment will worsen.
The nature of CPEC’s interregional connectivity dictates resources are bound to leave Balochistan no matter what. Promising no resources leave the province would be impractical and counter-productive. Instead, what can be done is to ensure Balochistan receives a disproportionally high benefit from CPEC projects to help de-escalate the insurgency and improve its low HDI. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.
Take, for example, the Saindak copper mine project. Only 2% of revenue is awarded to the Balochistan province; meanwhile, the Metallurgical Corporation of China receives 50%, and the Pakistani federal government receives the remaining 48% (Muhammad, 2014). In addition, the Balochistan Mineral Resources Development Board, formed in 2015 to oversee exploration and mining licenses, is indirectly controlled by the federal government. Seven of the nine members are bureaucrats, with only the final two being elected officials (Rafiq, 2017).
This almost certainly indicates CPEC has so far continued the status quo. Until more is done to ensure the social development of Balochistan, the insurgency will continue to pose risks to CPEC.
Will CPEC Improve Pakistan’s Foreign Relations?
It is almost an unwritten rule that when it comes to Pakistani foreign affairs, one has to mention India and vice versa. The Indo-Pak rivalry is virtually iconic in nature, going back to the establishment of the respective countries as they gained independence from the British, resulting in the largest human migration in history. Over a million people lost their lives, and many more were displaced in what is now known as Partition. Since then, Pakistan and India have fought a total of four wars.
Considering South Asia’s tumultuous history, there is a genuine concern CPEC may exacerbate the strained – if not dysfunctional – relationship between Pakistan and its much larger, economically superior neighbour.
Proponents of CPEC point towards the fact CPEC offers the opportunity to foster an economic partnership between India and Pakistan. It is within Chinese interests that as many countries as possible join the BRI as part of the country’s common destiny vision to bring peace and economic balance to the world (Wang & Liu, 2019; Yu, 2019). Hence, China invited India to BRI meetings in 2017 and 2019.
Similarly, Pakistan also wishes for peace with India. Following the flare-up in Indo-Pak tensions during the 2019 Pulwama Attack, which saw cross-border airstrikes carried out by both sides, Pakistan released a captured fighter pilot as a peace gesture (BBC, 2019). Furthermore, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan expressed his wishes for peace following the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the recent 2019 Indian elections, a desire reciprocated by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Mackenzie, 2019).
Unfortunately, India declined both Chinese invitations. This is part of India’s fear of being encircled by the BRI, thereby being shut out from international trade (Roy, 2019). As a result, India has been reluctant to join BRI negotiations so far, being critical of Chinese activities in the South China Sea and CPEC on the grounds it undermines India’s sovereignty claims over Kashmir (Pandit, 2018).
In fact, this fear has driven India to exploit the instability in Balochistan by publicly announcing its support for Baloch separatists in 2016 in an attempt to sabotage CPEC (Thakuria, 2019). Since then, the Baloch insurgency has been emboldened, leading to increased attacks on Pakistani military personnel and CPEC labourers (Rafiq, 2017).
On the 18th of April 2019, Baloch militants blocked the Makran coastal highway and executed 14 members of the Pakistan Armed Forces (Aamir, 2019). This highlights how, instead of being used as a tool for peace, CPEC has instead been exploited and used to deepen the Indo-Pak divide.
On the other hand, following India’s brutal lockdown in Kashmir, it was China that brought the issue to the UN Security Council on behalf of Pakistan (UN, 2019). This was partly due to the long-standing Sino-Pak relationship but also to protect Chinese interests in Kashmir, namely CPEC. As a result, it could also be argued CPEC, having brought China and Pakistan closer, has proven itself to serve Pakistani interests on the world stage by bringing important issues into the spotlight. Furthermore, the international perception of Pakistan has significantly improved, in no small part due to CPEC, in recent years (Mehmood & Ahmad, 2019).
However, at the time of writing, the Kashmir lockdown continues, and Indian Muslims are now at risk of losing their status as Indian citizens (Al-Jazeera, 2019; Chotiner, 2019). These issues will most certainly lead to more stand-offs between India and Pakistan. CPEC may not solve the many Indo-Pak disputes; however, it has given Pakistan the upper hand in international discourse, that is, the support of China.
Nonetheless, its well-known influence goes both ways, and Sino-Pak relations are no exception. By supporting Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute, China has effectively bought Pakistan’s silence on the various human rights violations occurring within Chinese borders. Pakistan has failed to publicly address China’s ethnic cleansing of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang despite jumping at any chance to call out India (Dhume, 2019). Considering the fact Pakistan was created on the basis of protecting the rights of Muslims and the country’s close ally, Turkey, has denounced China for its treatment of Muslims, this hypocrisy will undoubtedly lead to some future political complications.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear to see CPEC does indeed have the potential to revolutionise Pakistan. Not just economically but socially and politically as well. However, as highlighted, more needs to be done by Pakistan to ensure it can capitalise on this opportunity. Pakistan must ensure it does not fall into the many pitfalls of large investment packages, such as CPEC, which many other developing countries often fall into. It is also important to remember CPEC will not change the status quo on its own and needs the necessary policy changes to be truly effective. As such, I have decided to summarise the key steps I believe must be taken to ensure CPEC yields the greatest rewards with minimal losses.
First, as recommended by Arif Rafiq, Pakistan needs to create a formalised CPEC authority that oversees all investments from China (Rafiq, 2017). This should be led by the Prime Minister with equal representation from all provinces. This will ensure CPEC projects are distributed evenly and improve interagency coordination. As a result, this will build a sustainable consensus in favour of CPEC.
Second, I would suggest the government introduce their own version of China’s Leading Small Groups (LSGs) to supplement the CPEC authority (Rolland, 2019). Every project should have its own LSG that focuses on community dialogue to ensure local residents are kept in the loop, and their needs are addressed. This will significantly improve the public’s approval of CPEC.
Third, Pakistan must scale back on CPEC projects until the energy crisis is addressed. I propose Pakistan put all non-energy projects on hold and introduce more projects focused on increasing transmission efficiency. Once the energy projects are completed and the energy crisis ends, Pakistan should begin work on other CPEC projects. This will help avoid another ‘Punjab Speed’ incident (Rafiq, 2019).
Fourth, I would recommend CPEC place more emphasis on renewable energy. In doing so, Pakistan can ensure a sustainable energy supply, which will help foster long-term economic growth. Introducing solar panels on a local scale will be especially effective in rural communities. In fact, Balochistan has a solar power potential of over 2,200 kWh/m² per year, making it the ideal location for concentrated solar power plants (World Bank, 2020).
Fifth, CPEC should invest in more welfare projects on the local level, especially in Balochistan. This will help ensure the correct social development measures are being taken to improve education and healthcare provision throughout Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan’s HDI will increase along with household incomes. Thereby, CPEC will be able to alleviate poverty and contribute to the betterment of Pakistani citizens.
Sixth, Pakistan must review its economic policy to increase government revenue and protect workers’ rights, especially in SEZs. By doing so, Pakistan will end the debt crisis and ensure Pakistani citizens are not exploited by foreign companies. More importantly, it will provide the government with the necessary funds to continue social development throughout Pakistan.
Lastly, Pakistan must ensure peace with its neighbours so CPEC can continue unhindered. To do this, Pakistan must invite its neighbours to the negotiation table and discuss how Pakistan can facilitate trade between South Asia and the wider world. One example would be connecting Afghanistan to CPEC via an Afghanistan-Pakistan economic corridor (Rafiq, 2017). Thereby giving Pakistan access to Afghanistan’s natural resources and giving Afghanistan access to the Arabian Sea.
Aamir, A., 2019. How Baloch Separatists Are Trying to Derail China’s Investments in Pakistan, Tampa: World Politics Review.
Al-Jazeera, 2018. US ‘war on terror’ has killed over half a million people: study, Doha: Al-Jazeera.
Al-Jazeera, 2019. Kashmir under lockdown: All the latest updates, Doha: Al-Jazeera.
AQI, 2019. Air Pollution in the World: Real-time Air Quality Index (AQI). [Online] Available at: https://aqicn.org/search/#q=Pakistan [Accessed 24 December 2019].
Baloch, I., 2015. Balochistan: Rich In Natural Resources And Poor In Living Conditions, Quetta: The Balochistan Point.
Hurley, J., Morris, S. & Portelance, G., 2018. Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, Washington DC: Center for Global Development.
Khawar, H., 2019. CPEC debt trap — fiction or reality?, Karachi: The Express Tribune.
Kratz, A., Feng, A. & Wright, L., 2019. New Data on the “Debt Trap” Question, Washington DC: Rhodium Group.
Kugelman, M., 2019. Great Potential, Many Pitfalls: Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Asian Affairs, 50(2), pp. 180-186.
Mackenzie, J., 2019. Pakistan says wants peace with India, Modi responds after victory speech, London: Reuters.
Malik, M. S., 2019. Interview: CPEC special economic zones to create 575,000 direct jobs in Pakistan, Beijing: Xinhua.
Masood, Y., 2019. China economic corridor is debt reliever for Pakistan, London: The Telegraph.
Mehmood, K. & Ahmad, Z., 2019. How Pakistan’s foreign policy pendulum swung in 2019. , Karachi: The Express Tribune.
Ministry of Planning and Development, 2017. Long Term Plan for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (2017-2030), Islamabad: Ministry of Planning and Development.
Ministry of Planning and Development, 2019. CPEC | China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Official Website. [Online] Available at: http://cpec.gov.pk/ [Accessed 24 December 2019].
Muhammad, P., 2014. Saindak Copper-Gold Project: Govt moves to transfer ownership to Balochistan, Karachi: The Express Tribune.
Pandit, R., 2018. India expresses strong opposition to China Pakistan Economic Corridor, says challenges Indian sovereignty, Mumbai: The Economic Times.
Rafiq, A., 2017. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Barriers and Impact, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
Rafiq, A., 2019. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: The Lure of Easy Financing and the Perils of Poor Planning. Asian Affairs, 50(2), pp. 236-248.
Rehman, A. & Tahir, K., 2019. Pakistan: Foreign reserves and the debt crisis, London: London School of Economics and Political Science.
Rehman, M., 2018. Pakistan’s electricity generation has increased over time. So why do we still not have uninterrupted supply?, Karachi: Dawn.
Reuters, 2018. Pakistan home to world’s third-largest ‘slave’ population, Karachi: The Express Tribune.
Rolland, N., 2019. Beijing’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative’s “Pushback”: A Story of Assessment and Adaptation. Asian Affairs, 50(2), pp. 216-235.
Roy, N., 2019. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – Is it the Road to the Future?. Asian Affairs, 50(2), pp. 268-282.
Schwemlein, J., 2019. Flawed by Design: The Challenge of Flawed Democracies to China’s Rise. Asian Affairs, 50(2), pp. 249-259.
Siddiqui, S., 2017. CPEC investment pushed from $55b to $62b, Karachi: The Express Tribune.
South China Morning Post, 2013. Pakistan hands management of strategic Gwadar port to China, Hong Kong: South China Morning Post.
Thakuria, N., 2019. India Pushes a Breakaway Balochistan, Hong Kong: Asia Sentinel.
The Economist, 1998. Why trade is good for you, London: The Economist.
UN, 2019. UN Security Council discusses Kashmir, China urges India and Pakistan to ease tensions, New York: UN News.
Wang, Y. & Liu, X., 2019. Is the Belt and Road Initiative a Chinese Geo-Political Strategy?. Asian Affairs, 50(2), pp. 260-267.
The Mughal emperor Shah Alam handing a scroll to Robert Clive, the Governor of Bengal, transferring tax collecting rights in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa to the East India Company on 12 August 1765.
The following piece is an essay I wrote at the end of year 12.
The question of the British Empire’s involvement in South Asia and other parts of the world is often debated. Upon visiting India in 1930, American Historian Will Durant wrote (Durant, 1930, p. 7):
The British conquest of India was the invasion and destruction of a high civilization by a trading company [The British East India Company] utterly without scruple or principle, careless of art and greedy of gain, over-running with fire and sword a country temporarily disordered and helpless, bribing and murdering, annexing and stealing, and beginning that career of illegal and “legal” plunder which has now [1930] gone on ruthlessly for one hundred and seventy-three years.
Will Durant The Case for India
On the other hand, Scottish historian Niall Ferguson writes (Ferguson, 2003, p. xxviii):
For better or worse — fair and foul — the world we know today is in large measure a product of Britain’s age of empire. The question is not whether British imperialism was without blemish. It was not. The question is whether there could have been a less bloody path to modernity. Perhaps in theory there could have been. But in practice?
Niall Ferguson Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World
It is clear to see opinions differ wildly regarding the British Empire and whether it hindered or facilitated development. In this essay, I will attempt to provide an overview of Britain’s involvement in India (1757-1947)[1] and determine whether the empire’s involvement was necessary for India to modernize. I will primarily focus on the economic impacts of British rule; however, it is important to note that British involvement had profound effects in all areas of development. For this essay, ‘India’ will also encompass modern-day Pakistan and Bangladesh[2].
Share of the World’s GDP (%) from 1600 to 1950(Maddison, 2003, p. 261)
1600
1700
1820
1870
1913
1950
India
22.4
24.4
16.0
12.1
7.5
4.2
Britain
1.8
2.9
5.2
9.0
8.2
6.5
Thanks to Angus Madison’s extensive work on the world’s economic history, we now know in the year 1600, during the Mughal era[3], India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounted for 22.4% of the world’s economy. This increased to 24.4% in 1700, making India the largest economy in the world, ahead of both China and Western Europe. Meanwhile, Britain accounted for a measly 1.8% (1600) and 2.9% (1700). However, by 1820, after 63 years of company rule, Britain’s share rose to 5.2% while India’s share fell to 16%. This trend of British economic growth and Indian economic decline continued. By 1950, 3 years after the end of the British Raj, India was left a shadow of its former glory at 4.2%.
Similarly, India was a leader in global manufacturing before British rule, with notable industries in textiles, shipbuilding, and steel. Mughal goods and cash crops were sold throughout the world, including Europe[4]. European powers had to export vast amounts of gold and silver to India to pay for Mughal imports as there was little demand for European products in India – Mughal India was largely self-sufficient – resulting in a significant trade imbalance[5] (Schmidt, 1995). This period of industrial growth is often referred to as a state of proto-industrialization, like eighteenth-century Western Europe before the Industrial Revolution. By the year 1750, India accounted for 24.5% of global manufacturing. However, in 1800, after only 43 years of Company rule, India’s share fell to 19.7%. By 1938, it was left at 2.4%[6] (Clingingsmith & Williamson, 2005, p. 34). Furthermore, economic historian Paul Bairoch highlights how India had a higher GNP per capita than Europe up until the late eighteenth century (Bairoch, 1995).
So, the question must be asked: What happened during those 190 years of British rule?
Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India, written by Indian Congress MP Shashi Tharoor, outlines various methods employed by the British during their rule over India that contributed to its economic decline. Tharoor also mentions Britain’s impact in other spheres of life within India, including law, politics and media. However, this essay will examine Tharoor’s explanations for how the British destroyed India’s key industries, resulting in the Subcontinent’s decline as a global economic superpower.
For centuries, India has been an important player in global trade. The Indian Subcontinent has been conducting international trade since the first century. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea describes navigation and trading opportunities from Roman Egyptian ports along the coast of the Red Sea to others along the Horn of Africa, the Sindh region of modern-day Pakistan, and southwestern regions of India during the first century. However, Tharoor brings to light Britain’s efforts in limiting India’s trade, ultimately replacing the Subcontinent’s role in global trade (Tharoor, 2017, p. 29):
British-based businesses simply could not compete [with Indian-based businesses], and so they petitioned Parliament for a ban on Indian shipbuilding. The first legislative act in their favour came in 1813 with a law that prohibited ships below 350 tonnes from sailing between the Indian colonies and the United Kingdom. That took 40 per cent of Bengal-built ships out of the lucrative India-England trade. A further Act in 1814 denied Indian-built ships the privilege of being deemed ‘British-registered vessels’ to trade with the United States and European continent. Though they could still, in theory trade with China, that sector had become unprofitable, since the previous practice had been to sail from Calcutta with Indian goods to China, load up on tea there for London, and return to Calcutta with British goods; with the London sector banned to them, these ships could only sail from Calcutta to China and back, but there was no market for Chinese goods in India (Indians were not yet tea drinkers) and the ships, denied access to London, often had to return empty.
Shashi Tharoor Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India
During the early eighteenth century, Bengal alone enjoyed a 25% share in the global textiles industry (Maddison, 1995, p. 30). British cloth manufacturers couldn’t compete with India’s low prices and labour costs. However, once the Company took over, East Indian Company Soldiers destroyed the looms of weavers[7], lowering the supply and production of goods, and imposed tariffs of 70-80% on Indian textiles, making exporting unviable. As a result, Indian textiles were no longer cheaper than their British counterparts, which began flooding the Indian market. Indians couldn’t impose retaliatory tariffs on British goods since the British controlled both the ports and the government. In turn, the Indian textile industry was sent into decline; meanwhile, British imports soared to over 1 billion yards of cotton by 1870 (Wilson, 2016, p. 321). It is important to note while India no longer manufactured cotton goods, the Subcontinent still grew cotton to send to Britain. And so began a trend of shipping primary[8] goods to Britain for manufacturing, into secondary[9] goods, then back to India and the rest of the world to be sold, essentially moving India away from a secondary sector economy into a primary sector economy. Meanwhile, kick-starting the Industrial Revolution in Britain. Tharoor highlights how this method of moving secondary industry from India to Britain was applied across the board, thus explaining Britain’s rise as a global superpower at the expense of India’s economy.
In addition, many artisans forced out of the secondary economy went into agriculture. This massive influx of disenfranchised people into the agricultural sector decreased rural wages, thus forcing rural areas into poverty. During the Mughal era, real wages and living standards in Bengal and South India were higher than in Britain (Parthasarathi, 2011). In fact, during the early seventeenth century, the primary sector accounted for 64%[10] of India’s workforce, with the secondary and tertiary[11] sectors accounting for 11% and 25%, respectively, each contributing to 52% (primary), 18% (secondary) and 29% (tertiary) of India’s economy (Moosvi, 1987; Yazdani, 2017, p. 120). However, during British rule, the secondary sector’s contribution fell to 11% during the early twentieth century. Thus highlighting the Subcontinent’s shift from a secondary-focused economy to a primary-focused economy. If we were to consider Rostow’s model, then India was, in effect, forced to move away from stage 2 (developing manufacturing industry on the verge of intense activity) and back to stage 1 (subsistence farming or hunter-gatherer).
On the contrary, B. R. Tomlinson presents the idea the textile industry’s decline was instead a direct result of the Industrial Revolution (Tomlinson, 1993). Indian textiles were handmade just like the rest of the world before the advent of machinery. Therefore, it could be argued India’s textile industry was wiped out by the technological superiority of Britain. Thus, Indian weavers were victims of technological obsolescence instead of deliberate British policy. It is, of course, no doubt even in a free India, Indian textiles would’ve been unable to compete with the mass-produced textiles in Britain. That being said, a free India could impose tariffs on British imports, thus softening the blow against India’s economy. Furthermore, a free India could also import technology[12] and compete with Britain’s textile industry. A free India may well experience a decrease in its share of the global economy but not the dramatic economic decline we saw during the late eighteenth century to early twentieth century.
One often cited argument during debates about British colonialism is the idea Britain helped India modernize by building infrastructure in the form of railways and irrigation systems. By the late nineteenth century, Britain had built the world’s fourth-largest railway network in India[13]. This totalled 38,922 km of railway in 1901 and radiated inland from the major port cities of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta (Hurd & Kerr, 2012, p. 3). Thus significantly speeding up the transport of primary materials from their inland plantations and mines to the coastal ports, where they would then be shipped abroad, primarily to England, to be used in manufacturing. Furthermore, Britain also heavily invested in irrigation infrastructure; by 1900, India had the world’s most extensive irrigation system[14]. For example, the Ganges Canal reached 560 km from Haridwar to Cawnpore and supplied thousands of miles of distribution canals. Or even the case of Assam, which in 1840 was a jungle but by 1900 had around 4 million acres under cultivation. By 1947, about 22 million hectares of British India was under cultivation. In the North-western British India region alone, 2.2 million hectares of previously barren land was irrigated by the 1940s, most of which is now part of Pakistan. British historian David Gilmour also points out the impact of the new irrigation systems (Gilmour, 2005, p. 9):
By the 1870s the peasantry in the districts irrigated by the Ganges Canal were visibly better fed, housed and dressed than before.
David Gilmour The Ruling Caste: Imperial Lives in the Victorian Raj
There, of course, is no denying the legacy of British infrastructure and its significance in shaping the modern-day economy of the Indian Subcontinent. Take the modern state of India, which is now among one of the fastest-growing economies in the world (BRICS[15]), thanks largely in part to its inherited infrastructure from the British Raj. Today, Indian railways provide a net income of US$930 million. Meanwhile, irrigation systems have since been expanded[16], helping improve food security, improve agricultural productivity and create rural job opportunities. In addition, dams used for irrigation projects also produce electricity, provide water to a growing population, control floods and prevent droughts. This has helped India become the world’s second-largest agricultural producer, behind China, with a total agrarian output worth US$354 billion. Similarly, Pakistan and Bangladesh are ranked seventh (US$65 billion) and nineteenth (US$31 billion).
In conclusion, it is clear to see that British imperialism displaced the Indian Subcontinent from its number one position in the global economy. Even today, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh collectively hold a share of 8.344% (2015) of the world’s global GDP compared to the Mughal era height of 24.4%. However, there is also no denying that British colonial-era infrastructure has significantly influenced the Subcontinent’s economic growth. That said, we must remember this economic growth has occurred in the last seventy-two years since Partition in 1947. Therefore, it should be attributed to the efforts made by the native governments and their expansions of British infrastructure rather than British colonial rule. Had Britain truly proved to be the catalyst of Indian economic growth, then there should never have been an economic decline during British governance in the first place. Furthermore, British administration may not have been needed in the first place to provide infrastructure because many countries did not need to be colonized by Britain to build railways[17]. Therefore, it is safe to say overall, British imperialism had negatively affected economic development in the Indian Subcontinent despite its investment in Indian infrastructure[18].
References
Bairoch, P., 1995. Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Clingingsmith, D. & Williamson, J. G., 2005. India’s Deindustrialization in the 18th and 19th Centuries, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Durant, W., 1930. The Case for India. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Ferguson, N., 2003. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Penguin Books.
Gilmour, D., 2005. The Ruling Caste: Imperial Lives in the Victorian Raj. London: Pimlico.
Hurd, J. & Kerr, I. J., 2012. India’s Railway History: A Research Handbook. Leiden: Brill Publishers.
Maddison, A., 1995. Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Maddison, A., 2003. The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Moosvi, S., 1987. The economy of the Mughal Empire, c. 1595: a statistical study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parthasarathi, P., 2011. Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schmidt, K. J., 1995. An Atlas and Survey of South Asian History. London: M.E. Sharpe.
Tharoor, S., 2017. Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India. London: Penguin Random House UK.
Tomlinson, B. R., 1993. The Economy of Modern India 1870-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, J., 2016. India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Yazdani, K., 2017. India, Modernity and the Great Divergence: Mysore and Gujarat (17th to 19th C.). Leiden: Brill Publishers.
Footnotes
[1] This time period includes both British East India Company rule (1757-1858) and British Crown rule (1858-1947).
[2] In 1947, the Indian Subcontinent was partitioned into the modern states of India and Pakistan. East Pakistan then seceded from West Pakistan in 1971, forming the modern state of Bangladesh.
[3] Founded in 1526 by Emperor Babur, the Mughal Empire went on to control the majority of the Indian Subcontinent by 1700 before its eventual decline and dissolution in 1857.
[4] In early modern Europe, there was significant demand for products from Mughal India, particularly cotton textiles, spices, peppers, indigo, silks, and saltpetre (for use in munitions). European fashion had become increasingly dependent on Mughal Indian textiles and silks.
[5] The Mughals could easily afford European goods, but Europeans couldn’t easily afford Mughal goods.
[6] This was an increase from 1.4% in 1913, which can be explained by the fact India experienced multiple famines from 1870 to 1921; India’s manufacturing industries were doubly affected during this time.
[7] According to many contemporary accounts, Company soldiers may have even gone about breaking the thumbs of Indian weavers.
[8] Primary refers to an industry concerned with obtaining or providing natural raw materials for conversion into commodities and products for the consumer.
[9] Secondary refers to an industry that converts raw materials provided by the primary industry into commodities and products for the consumer.
[10] During this time, 65-90% of Europe’s workforce was in the primary sector.
[11] Tertiary refers to an industry concerned with the provision of services.
[12] The Mughal Empire used and produced an extensive array of gunpowder weaponry – gunpowder being invented in 9th century China – and therefore, Indians were indeed capable of attaining and mastering the use of foreign technology.
[13] India still holds 4th place with a total of around 65,000 km of railway.
[14] Much of the increase in irrigation during the British colonial era was targeted at dedicated poppy and opium farms to export to China.
[15] BRICS is the acronym coined for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
[16] India’s irrigation had expanded to a potential covered crop area of 90 million hectares between 1947 and 1995.
[17] Thailand had built its first railway in 1894, known as the Paknam Railway, despite never being colonised by European powers.
[18] Most of these infrastructure projects were built to serve British business interests in the first place.
Aqil Ghani 