The following essay was originally submitted as an assignment for my university and was graded as a 2:1.
The biggest obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation is Israel’s siege mentality. To illustrate this, I utilise the spiral model to demonstrate how Israel’s security policies have contributed to the socio-economic deprivation and radicalisation of Palestinians, precipitating the very conditions allowing the conflict to persist. Following this, I argue Israel’s aggressive security policies are primarily informed by a collective siege mentality embedded in Israeli nationalism. Therefore, any genuine attempt at reconciliation requires tackling Israeli society’s collective siege mentality, softening Israel’s security policies, and alleviating the suffering of the Palestinian people.
Israel, Palestine and the Spiral Model
According to the spiral model, conflicts occur when one side punishes another with the false expectation it will elicit better behaviour. On the contrary, such punishment only provokes a violent reaction from the other side. Believing its initial punishment to have been too mild, the first side responds with more punishment, causing the other side to become even more belligerent in return. Thus, a cycle of perpetual punishment is born, forcing both sides to spiral into intense conflict. Therefore, the spiral model implies the best way to avoid conflict is through appeasement. In other words, ‘carrots’ rather than ‘sticks’ (Jervis, 1976, pp. 62-67).
By applying the spiral model to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it becomes clear Israel’s actions against Palestine have only served to exacerbate the conflict rather than solve it. For instance, Israel has carried out regular offensive military operations in the Gaza Strip to punish Palestinian militants, notably Hamas, with the false expectation it would end Palestinian militancy (Filiu, 2014). Instead, these military operations had the opposite effect. Following the 2008-2009 Gaza War, Palestinian militant activity intensified, eventually leading to the 2014 Gaza War and the current 2023 Israel-Hamas War.
Each of these wars has been deadlier than the last. During the 2008-2009 Gaza War, there were 1,400 fatalities, of whom 1,387 were Palestinians and 13 were Israelis (B’Tselem, 2009). During the 2014 Gaza War, there were 2,202 fatalities, of whom 2,131 were Palestinians and 71 were Israelis (OCHA, 2014). So far, during the ongoing 2023 Israel-Hamas War, there have been an unprecedented 16,415 fatalities, of whom 15,083 were Palestinians and 1,332 were Israelis (WHO, 2023). This exponential increase in fatalities indicates Israel’s disproportionate military responses have contributed to a cycle of perpetual punishment, which only serves to push both sides further away from reconciliation.
In a similar vein to the Gaza Strip, the presence of Israeli security forces in Jerusalem has also contributed to the perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the beginning of the conflict, Jerusalem has been a source of major contention on account of its religious significance to the three major Abrahamic traditions (Klein, 2022). In particular, Al-Aqsa, the third holiest site in Islam, has increasingly become the de-facto focal point of the conflict following annual clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinian worshippers.
Beginning in May 2021, Israeli security forces stormed Al-Aqsa Mosque in response to growing dissent surrounding the Sheikh Jarrah evictions, with the false expectation it would quell Palestinian resistance. Instead, the provocation escalated the conflict, prompting Hamas to fire rockets into Israel in response (Holmes & Beaumont, 2021). A year later, in April 2022, Israeli security forces stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque a second time to apprehend Palestinian protestors who had barricaded themselves inside (Kingsley & Abdulrahim, 2022). In April 2023, Israeli security forces stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque for a third time, eliciting violent responses from Palestinian militants based in Gaza and Southern Lebanon (Al-Jazeera, 2023; Debre & Akram, 2023)
This continual harassment of Palestinian worshippers at one of Islam’s holiest sites during the holy month of Ramadan has not only aggravated Palestinians but Muslims the world over. Given the conflict’s significant religious dimension, such escalations by Israeli security forces pose a considerable obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, contributing to the ongoing cycle of perpetual punishment (Kronish, 2022). This is illustrated by Hamas’ reference to the desecration of the Al-Aqsa as the primary justification behind the October 7th Attack (Nakhoul & Bassam, 2023). Thus highlighting how a false expectation that punishment elicits better behaviour can lead to intense conflict.
Much like Jerusalem, Israel’s security presence in the West Bank also poses an obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. Since the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank has become another major source of contention due to the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements (Handel, et al., 2022). Today, there are a total of 290 Israeli settlements and 465,400 Israeli settlers in the West Bank (Peace Now, 2023). The increasing settler presence has inevitably led to hostilities with the local Palestinian population, prompting Israel to implement increasingly stringent security measures.
Following the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel began building illegal settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, leading to the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987. During the 1990s, Israel responded to the growing violence by building a system of checkpoints to separate Israelis and Palestinians, with the false expectation such measures would elicit better behaviour from the Palestinians (Berda, 2017). In reality, the checkpoints further aggravated the Palestinians by easing the movement of Israelis between the settlements and Israel proper while simultaneously restricting the movement of Palestinians within the West Bank (Handel, 2014).
After the 1995 Oslo II Accord, the majority of the West Bank fell under Israeli security control, allowing Israel to continue its settlement project unhindered, leading to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. This prompted Israel to implement even stricter security measures, including the construction of its infamous separation barrier within Palestinian territory, aggravating Palestinians even more (Falke, 2013). In recent years, standoffs between Israeli security forces and Palestinians in the West Bank have become a daily occurrence, contributing to the cycle of perpetual punishment, driving both sides further from reconciliation.
All-in-all, Israel’s aggressive security policies have contributed to the socio-economic deprivation of Palestinians. For instance, Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip, coupled with the devastation wrought during its military incursions, resulted in a poverty rate of 61% in 2020 (World Bank, 2022). Similarly, Israel’s increasing settler presence in Jerusalem and the West Bank, coupled with the rampant restrictions on Palestinians, has contributed to feelings of injustice and inequality. This is best illustrated by the disparity between both sides’ Human Development Index (HDI) scores. Palestine’s HDI stood at 0.715 in 2021 and is projected to drop to as low as 0.674 by the end of the 2023 Israel-Hamas War (UNDP, 2023, pp. 8-10). Compare this to Israel’s HDI of 0.919 in 2021, and it is clear there exists a blatant socio-economic inequality brought about by security policies favouring Israelis at the expense of Palestinians (UNDP, 2022).
It is well documented that poor socio-economic conditions and feelings of perceived injustice are the perfect breeding ground for radicalisation, allowing militant groups like Hamas to increase their influence (Horgan, 2003; Newman, 2006, p. 764). Thus, by responding to Palestinian belligerence with punishments which further the socio-economic deprivation of Palestinians, Israel is contributing to the very phenomenon it wishes to solve. This again illustrates how punishment leads to intense conflict, pushing both sides further from reconciliation.
By viewing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the lens of the spiral model, it is clear punishment has not served reconciliation. Contrast this to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where Israel followed a policy of gradual normalisation, and it becomes apparent the road to reconciliation lies with appeasement (Barakat, 2023). For instance, following Egypt’s surprise attack on Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel agreed to establish a buffer zone under the 1974 Sinai I Agreement despite winning more territorial gains than it had during the 1967 Six-Day War. This led to the 1975 Sinai II Agreement, eventually snowballing into the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Similarly, appeasing the Palestinians with the 1993 Oslo I Accord opened the doors for the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the Second Intifada, in response to Israel’s growing settler presence, put a premature end to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation.
By appeasing the Arab states, Israel was able to guarantee secure borders with Egypt and Jordan. Had Israel applied the same process of gradual appeasement with the Palestinians following the Second Intifada without radicalising them through their aggressive punishments, then perhaps Hamas wouldn’t have gained power in the Gaza Strip. This, in turn, would have avoided the last two decades of conflict.
Israel’s Siege Mentality
The spiral model demonstrates how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been perpetuated by Israel’s false perception that punishment, in the form of aggressive security policies, will illicit better behaviour from belligerent Palestinians. Building on this, spiral theorists posit such false perception results from collective psychological processes (Jervis, 1976, pp. 67-76). In the case of Israel, the false perception is primarily informed by a collective siege mentality embedded in Israeli nationalism.
The term ‘siege mentality’ refers to “the mental state in which members of a group hold a central belief that the rest of the world has highly negative behavioural intentions toward them” (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992, p. 251). Shaped by historical traumas, notably the Holocaust and 1973 Yom Kippur War, and now the recent October 7th Attack, the Jewish nation has long perceived itself to be constantly under threat from the wider world. This entrenched belief has since become a cornerstone of Israeli nationalism, fuelling a narrative prioritising unwavering strength and stringent security measures as essential for survival (Klar, et al., 2013). Thereby framing Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip and increasing security presence in Jerusalem and the West Bank as necessary measures to protect against the existential threat posed by Palestinian belligerency. This, in turn, feeds the false perception punishment works better than appeasement.
Lasting peace ultimately lies in Israel overcoming its collective siege mentality, making it the biggest obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. Doing so will precipitate a shift from punishment to appeasement, ending the spiral into perpetual violence. While overcoming Israel’s siege mentality will be difficult, the outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict proves it is not impossible (Barakat, 2023). It was Israel’s siege mentality and fear of vulnerability which drove it to carry out its pre-emptive strikes against Egypt during the 1967 Six-Day War. Twelve years later, Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt.
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the significant power asymmetry between Israel and Palestine has profound implications for reconciliation. As the more dominant party, Israel holds a considerable advantage in terms of military strength, economic resources, and political influence. The lack of institutional power on the Palestinian side, compounded by the socio-economic deprivation resulting from prolonged conflict, places them in a vulnerable position. The power disparity becomes particularly evident in negotiations, where Israel’s advantageous position allows it to dictate the terms and pace of the peace process (Ramsbotham, 2022).
Given this power imbalance, the onus for driving meaningful progress towards reconciliation falls heavily on Israel. As the more powerful actor, Israel can implement substantial changes in its security policies to create a fairer socio-economic environment for Palestinians. It is incumbent upon Israel to proactively seek avenues for de-escalation, initiate confidence-building measures, and address the underlying grievances fuelling Palestinian discontent. By taking the initiative in softening its security policies, Israel has the potential to set the stage for genuine reconciliation, paving the way for a more stable and peaceful coexistence with Palestine.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the spiral model demonstrates the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the result of Israel’s false expectation that punishment will elicit better behaviour from the Palestinians. Examples from the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, and the West Bank demonstrate how Israel’s aggressive security policies have exacerbated tensions and driven both sides further away from reconciliation. The socio-economic deprivation resulting from these policies has led to the radicalisation of Palestinian society, creating the very conditions allowing the conflict to persist. Therefore, a shift towards appeasement, as seen with the Arab-Israeli Conflict, is crucial for achieving lasting reconciliation and avoiding prolonged conflict.
Building on this, Israel’s siege mentality stands out as the biggest obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation for being the primary causal factor for Israel’s aggressive security. Overcoming Israel’s siege mentality will inevitably lead to a shift from punishment to appeasement that softens Israel’s security policies and alleviates the suffering of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the inherent power imbalance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict places responsibility on Israel to initiate peace, address grievances, and foster trust, highlighting the moral imperative for the stronger party to lead towards genuine reconciliation.
References
Al-Jazeera, 2023. Israel says more than 30 rockets fired from southern Lebanon, Doha: Al-Jazeera.
B’Tselem, 2009. B’Tselem’s investigation of fatalities in Operation Cast Lead, Jerusalem: B’Tselem.
Barakat, A., 2023. The Arab World and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. In: A. Siniver, ed. Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. London: Routledge, pp. 394-404.
Bar-Tal, D. & Antebi, D., 1992. Siege mentality in Israel. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 16(3), pp. 251-275.
Berda, Y., 2017. Living Emergency: Israel’s Permit Regime in the Occupied West Bank. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Debre, I. & Akram, F., 2023. Violence erupts at Jerusalem holy site for a 2nd night, New York: Associated Press.
Falke, S., 2013. “Good fences make…”: The Separation Fence in Israel and its Influence on Society. In: A. Lechevalier & J. Wielgohs, eds. Borders and Border Regions in Europe: Changes, Challenges and Chances. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, pp. 255-266.
Filiu, J.-P., 2014. The Twelve Wars on Gaza. Journal of Palestine Studies, 44(1), pp. 52-60.
Handel, A., 2014. Gated/gating community: the settlement complex in the West Bank. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 39(4), pp. 504-517.
Handel, A., Allegra, M. & Maggor, E., 2022. The Israeli Settlements: Past, Present and Future. In: A. Siniver, ed. Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. London: Routledge, pp. 218-233.
Holmes, O. & Beaumont, P., 2021. Israeli police storm al-Aqsa mosque ahead of Jerusalem Day march, London: The Guardian.
Horgan, J., 2003. The Search for the Terrorist Personality. In: A. Silke, ed. Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 3-28.
Jervis, R., 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kingsley, P. & Abdulrahim, R., 2022. Israeli Government Crisis Deepens After Closing of Major Mosque, New York: The New York Times.
Klar, Y., Schori-Eyal, N. & Klar, Y., 2013. The “Never Again” State of Israel: The Emergence of the Holocaust as a Core Feature of Israeli Identity and Its Four Incongruent Voices. Journal of Social Issues, 69(1), pp. 125-143.
Klein, M., 2022. Jerusalem. In: A. Siniver, ed. Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. London: Routledge, pp. 205-217.
Kronish, R., 2022. The Role of Religion and Interreligious Dialogue in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In: A. Siniver, ed. Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. London: Routledge, pp. 276-287.
Nakhoul, S. & Bassam, L., 2023. Who is Mohammed Deif, the Hamas commander behind the attack on Israel?, London: Reuters.
Newman, E., 2006. Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(8), pp. 749-772.
OCHA, 2014. Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency Situation Report (as of 4 September 2014, 08:00 hrs), New York: OCHA.
Peace Now, 2023. Settlement Watch – Data. [Online] Available at: https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population [Accessed 4 December 2023].
Ramsbotham, O., 2022. Radical Asymmetry, Conflict Resolution, and Strategic Engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In: A. Siniver, ed. Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. London: Routledge, pp. 89-102.
UNDP, 2022. Human Development Reports – Israel. [Online] Available at: https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/specific-country-data#/countries/ISR [Accessed 5 December 2023].
UNDP, 2023. Gaza war: expected socioeconomic impacts on the State of Palestine: Preliminary estimations until 5 November 2023, New York: UNDP.
WHO, 2023. oPt Emergency Situation Update Issue 14 As of 23 November 2023, 17:00, Geneva: WHO.
World Bank, 2022. Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liason Committee, Washington DC: World Bank.