The following essay was originally submitted as an assignment for my university and was graded as a 2:2.
In the early hours of Wednesday, 14th June 2017, a catastrophic high-rise fire in West London shook the UK, triggering a national introspection on building safety and regulatory compliance. The Grenfell Fire, a disastrous blaze that claimed the lives of seventy-two people, stands as the worst residential fire since the German bombings of World War Two, exposing a myriad of systematic failures, from regulatory oversights to severe lapses in safety measures (BBC, 2019). In the immediate aftermath of the fire, Prime Minister Theresa May announced a public inquiry led by Martin Moore-Bick, a retired judge, “to establish the facts of what happened at Grenfell Tower in order to take the necessary action to prevent a similar tragedy from happening again” (UK Parliament, 2017).
The initial response to the public inquiry was mixed. Sophie Khan, a solicitor for survivors of the 2009 Lakanal House Fire, argued that an inquest would better serve survivors as it allows them to directly participate in proceedings, while a government-led inquiry could lead to survivors being sidelined (Sharman, 2017). Building on this, many survivors criticised the lack of diversity in the inquiry panel and were suspicious of Moore-Bick’s background, claiming it was not representative of the local community (BBC, 2017). On the other hand, Louise Christian, another solicitor for survivors of the Lakanal House Fire, argued that a public inquiry would pressure the government to implement its findings, preventing another tragedy from occurring in the future (Christian, 2017). Furthermore, an anonymous legal columnist in the New Statesman argued that Moore-Bick’s background in commercial law made him the right fit for the role of inquiry lead as he is “trained to root out the truth” (Anon., 2017).
In the years since the devastating event, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has only published its phase one report in October 2019, offering a comprehensive overview of the events that transpired the night of the fire and highlighting serious failings in the London Fire Brigade’s (LFB) preparation and response. The report was largely welcomed by survivors and eventually led to the resignation of LFB chief Dany Cotton in December 2019 (Booth & Bowcott, 2019; Booth, 2019). Phase two of the inquiry, investigating the causes of the fire, began in January 2020 but has faced significant delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the April 2024 newsletter, the phase two report is reaching its final stages. So far, no date has been provided for its publication (Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2024).
With the Grenfell Tower Inquiry ongoing and many questions left unanswered, this essay aims to determine the extent to which the Grenfell Fire should be considered a preventable catastrophe. In the first section, I critique the structural design of Grenfell Tower, highlighting residents’ safety concerns and the local council’s lacklustre response. In the second section, I analyse the immediate causes of the Grenfell Fire, its spread, and the eventual failure of the ‘Stay Put’ policy. In the third section, I contextualise the fire within broader societal issues, discussing how it was a symptom of state-led gentrification strategies driven by structural classism and racism. In the final section, I summarise the main arguments made in sections one through three, demonstrating that the Grenfell Fire was a preventable catastrophe rooted in systematic failure and neglect.
The Building
Initially built in 1974 as the first phase of Lancaster West Estate, Grenfell Tower was a twenty-four-story residential block containing one hundred and twenty-nine flats, housing up to six hundred people (The Telegraph, 2017; Todd, 2018). The main principle behind Grenfell Tower’s construction was compartmentation. Each flat was designed to be a self-contained unit reinforced with fire-protection measures. The idea was that should a fire occur in one of the flats, it wouldn’t be able to spread to another. According to its lead architect, Nigel Whitbread (Gras, 2016):
The design is a very simple and straightforward concept. You have a central core containing the lift, staircase and the vertical risers for the services, and then you have external perimeter columns. The services are connected to the central boiler and pump, which powered the whole development, and this is located in the basement of the tower block. This basement is about 4 meters deep and, in addition, has 2 meters of concrete at its base. This foundation holds up the tower block, and in situ concrete columns and slabs and pre-cast beams all tie the building together. Ronan Point, the tower that partially collapsed in 1968, had been built like a pack of cards. Grenfell Tower was a totally different form of construction and, from what I can see, could last another 100 years.
Grenfell Tower is a flexible building although designed for flats. You could take away all those internal partitions and open it up if that’s what you wanted to do in the future. This was unusual in terms of residential tower blocks. I also don’t know of any other council-built tower block in London or anywhere else in England that also has the central core and six flats per floor rather than four flats, which is typically done on the London County Council or Greater London Council plans. We were wanting to put our own identity on this. The GLC built Silchester Estate, and I had nothing against that, but this was so different in many ways. While a lot of brick had been used in LCC and GLC buildings, we thought that putting bricks one on top of the other for twenty storeys was a crazy thing to do. We used insulated pre-cast concrete beams as external walls, lifted up and put into place with cranes, and they were so much more quicker.
Nigel Whitbread
Lancaster West Estate – An Ideal for Living?
While the building was undoubtedly innovative for the 1970s, it fell short of modern safety standards. Firstly, Grenfell Tower only had a single staircase (Knapton & Dixon, 2017). A second staircase would’ve provided residents with an additional means of escape if the first was blocked by rubble or smoke, as was the case with the Grenfell Fire. In July 2023, Housing Secretary Michael Gove announced that new residential buildings above eighteen metres would require a second staircase; however, such regulations won’t be enforced until at least 2026 (Banks, 2023). Compared to other countries, such as New Zealand, the US and India, which already have such requirements in place, it becomes clear the UK has disappointingly lagged behind regarding this crucial safety standard (Speckert, 2024).
Secondly, Grenfell Tower was not fitted with a sprinkler system when it was constructed in 1974 (Knapton & Dixon, 2017). This is especially shocking when you consider the inquiry into the Summerland Disaster a year before, which pointed out the lack of sprinklers as a major safety flaw that led to the death of fifty people (BBC, 2018; Carter, 2003). Sprinklers are known to work as intended in 94% of fire incidents, controlling or extinguishing fires in 99% of cases, making them the most effective fire safety measure available (National Fire Chiefs Council, 2019). A sprinkler system would’ve prevented the spread of the fire inside Grenfell Tower, protecting both residents attempting to escape and the firefighters sent in to rescue them. As of May 2020, blocks of flats taller than eleven metres are required to have sprinkler systems installed; however, there is still no requirement for buildings built before 2007 to retrospectively install sprinklers (Fire Protection Association, 2023). Again, the UK still falls short of other countries, such as Australia and Dubai, which require high-rise buildings to be fitted with external sprinklers in addition to internal sprinklers (Knapton & Dixon, 2017).
Thirdly, Grenfell Tower underwent renovations from June 2014 until July 2016 to improve its visual appearance and energy efficiency by adding cladding to the exterior (Davies, et al., 2019). The cladding was made of two parts: Celotex’s RS5000 insulation glued to a plywood backing attached to the tower’s outer surface, followed by a fifty-millimetre air gap, then Arconic’s Reynobond PE panels. The Reynobond PE panels contained highly flammable polyethylene sandwiched between two aluminium sheets and burned ten times faster than similar products during safety tests conducted in 2004 (Hammond, 2021). As such, they have been banned from being used on high-rise buildings in Germany and the US (Booth & Weaver, 2017; Davies, 2017b). Similarly, the RS5000 insulation was found to be “more flammable than the cladding” in safety tests conducted by the Metropolitan Police following the fire (Rovnick, 2017; Siddique, 2017). Damningly for UK policymakers, the dangers of newly installed cladding were already known by the time of the Grenfell Fire, having contributed to the 1991 Knowsley Heights Fire, 1999 Garnock Court Fire, 2009 Lakanal House Fire and 2016 Shepherd’s Court Fire; however, no safety regulations had been implemented despite expert recommendations to do so (BBC, 2018; London Fire Brigade, 2016).
In the lead-up to the fire, the Grenfell Action Group (GAG) had continuously highlighted many safety concerns to the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), all of which fell on deaf ears. This included outdated fire extinguishers, a poor emergency lighting system, the removal of a walkway-level fire exit and the obstruction of the sole remaining entrance (Grenfell Action Group, 2013; 2014; 2016a). In addition to this, an independent risk assessment conducted in June 2016 highlighted more than forty serious fire safety concerns. This was followed by a fire deficiency notice from the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority in November 2016 (Busby, 2018). Despite these constant warnings, the KCTMO failed to sufficiently address safety concerns, prompting the GAG to morbidly predict that “it won’t be long before the words of this blog come back to haunt the KCTMO management, and we will do everything in our power to ensure that those in authority know how long and how appallingly our landlord has ignored their responsibility to ensure the health and safety of their tenants and leaseholders” (Grenfell Action Group, 2016b). The lack of action from the KCTMO illustrates an egregious level of negligence on the part of the local council.
The initial structural design and subsequent renovation of Grenfell Tower are indicative of the UK’s inadequate building regulations. Had policymakers demonstrated some foresight by acting on expert advice or following the standards set by other countries, fire traps like Grenfell Tower would never have been allowed to exist. Given the constant warnings and previous high-rise fires leading up to the Grenfell Fire, it is evident the local council was well aware of the risks yet refused to act on them. A clear-cut case of systemic failure by the UK government.
The Fire
At 00:54 on the 14th June 2017, Behailu Kebede of Flat 16 on the fourth floor of Grenfell Tower called the LFB and alerted them to a fire in his kitchen – specifically the fridge-freezer by the kitchen window. LFB appliances swiftly arrived at Grenfell Tower around five minutes later. At 01:09, the first firefighters had entered flat 16 and, by 01:21, had extinguished the fire surrounding the fridge-freezer. Unfortunately, despite the LFB’s timely response, this was not the end of the ordeal as the fire had managed to escape Flat 16 through the kitchen window and began to rapidly spread upwards, reaching the top of Grenfell Tower at 01:29. From there, the fire spread around all four sides of the building, engulfing its entirety by 04:44. The last resident to escape was rescued by firefighters at 08:07 while the fire continued to burn until 01:14 the following day, more than twenty-four hours after Kebede’s initial call (Moore-Bick, 2019).
The primary mechanism behind the Grenfell Fire’s rapid development was the building’s external cladding. Radiant heat from the highly flammable Reynobond PE panels and RS5000 insulation combined with air rushing through the fifty-millimetre gap resulted in a ‘chimney effect’ that increased the fire’s intensity, igniting the floors above (McKenna, et al., 2019; Sharma & Mishra, 2021). To make matters worse, the LFB’s water jets were “having no impact on fire suppression as the fire was spreading behind the panelling and it was difficult to direct a flow of water onto the fire” (London Fire Brigade, 2018, p. 21). Thus, the dangerous cladding undermined the compartmentation principle behind Grenfell Tower’s construction by allowing the fire to move unhindered from one flat to another, penetrating windows from the outside.
Additional weaknesses in the building’s design began to come to the fore as the fire progressed. Outdated fire doors with improper seals allowed smoke to move from the affected flats and into the central core, compromising the single staircase that provided residents with their only means of escape (Lane, 2018a, pp. 51-54). On top of this, the lack of a centrally activated alarm system meant many residents had no idea there was a fire until it was too late to evacuate due to the smoke-clogged staircase (Lane, 2018b, pp. 11-13). Furthermore, the absence of a sprinkler system to combat the fire’s spread within the building left firefighters unprotected, significantly hindering rescue attempts. Had UK policymakers introduced more stringent building regulations, these design flaws would’ve been resolved, dramatically decreasing the overall death toll.
The KCTMO’s failure to adequately address residents’ safety concerns also contributed to the fire’s devastating impact. As early as March 2017, residents had expressed concern surrounding the installation of new gas pipes that had been left exposed. Despite assurances the pipes would be covered in fire protection, two-thirds of the pipes were still left uncovered by the time of the Grenfell Fire (Booth, et al., 2017). Once breached, these exposed gas pipes added fuel to the ongoing fire, contributing to its sustained duration and preventing the LFB from moving its Bridgehead further up the building (Lane, 2018c, p. 29). This example is but one of many that demonstrates how systemic negligence by the KCTMO directly hindered the LFB’s emergency response, resulting in horrific consequences for the residents of Grenfell Tower.
Another major failure of the Grenfell Fire was the imposition of the injudicious ‘Stay Put’ policy. Based on the presumption of uncompromised compartmentation, the ‘Stay Put’ policy advised residents to stay within their flats in the event of a fire unless the fire was discovered within their flat or they were advised to evacuate by the LFB (Schraer & Goodman, 2017). In the case of Grenfell Tower, the dangerous cladding had compromised its compartmentation, making the ‘Stay Put’ policy redundant. By the time the ‘Stay Put’ policy was officially abandoned in favour of general evacuation at 02:47, it was already too late; residents on the upper floors were trapped by the smoke clogging up the central core (Moore-Bick, 2019, p. 329). Thus, the ill-informed advice of the ‘Stay Put’ policy had directly led to the deaths of seventy-two people (BBC, 2019).
Unfortunately, the Grenfell Fire wasn’t the first time the ‘Stay Put’ policy failed. Following the 2005 Harrow Court Fire, in which two firefighters and one resident were killed, the Fire Brigades Union called for a review of the ‘Stay Put’ policy (Bowcott, 2005). No such review came, and four years later, the ‘Stay Put’ policy directly contributed to the death of six residents during the 2009 Lakanal House Fire, one of whom was urged to stay in her flat by 999 responders until she died (BBC, 2018; Killelea, 2017). What’s more, the GAG was well aware of the ‘Stay Put’ policy’s inherent flaws, calling for its removal as early as November 2016: “Anyone who witnessed the recent tower block fire at Shepherds Court, in nearby Shepherd’s Bush, will know that the advice to remain in our properties would have led to certain fatalities and we are calling on our landlord to re-consider the advice that they have so badly circulated” (Grenfell Action Group, 2016b). Had the KCTMO heeded residents’ concerns and removed the ‘Stay Put’ policy, perhaps the Grenfell Fire wouldn’t have been so deadly; residents would’ve attempted to escape long before it became impossible. Bizarrely, the ‘Stay Put’ policy still remains in place in many tower blocks across the UK (Symonds, 2022).
The events of the 14th June 2017 were the realisation of the GAG’s worst fears. Poor structural design sanctioned by inadequate building regulations coupled with fire safety violations brought about by state negligence was behind the fire’s devastating impact. Furthermore, the Grenfell Fire serves as yet another example warranting a re-evaluation of the ineffective ‘Stay Put’ policy that has repeatedly proven itself redundant. While the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s phase one report showed the LFB’s response left much to be desired, the fundamental failings evidently lay with the UK government.
The Context
Grenfell Tower was located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), which stands as one of London’s whitest and wealthiest boroughs with a white population of 63.7% and a mean income of £73,917 (Bennett, 2022; Brazzill, 2023). However, like the rest of Lancaster West Estate, most of Grenfell Tower’s residents were from working class and ethnic minority backgrounds; 85% of those killed in the fire belonged to ethnic minorities (Townsend, 2020). Thus, in many ways, the RBKC is a “microcosm of a divided Britain” (Bennhold, 2017). The south of the borough is home to billionaires and royalty, while its north is home to some of London’s poorest. Sadly, these stark demographic differences resulted in dire outcomes for the residents of Grenfell Tower.
The RBKC’s fifty-member council, of whom forty-six were white and thirty-seven were Conservatives at the time of the fire, responded very differently to the complaints of the affluent and deprived (Bennhold, 2017). In the south, complaints regarding engine revving and basement development were swiftly addressed with the imposition of new fines and planning policies (Austin, 2015; The Guardian, 2014). Meanwhile, in the north, the council repeatedly undermined its poorer constituents with the closure of Maxilla Daycare and the proposed demolition of Kensington and Chelsea College (Linford, 2017; Maxilla Archive, 2016). On the whole, the council’s evident contempt for the socially vulnerable – which precipitated the KCTMO’s disastrous dismissal of the GAG’s complaints – is but a reflection of the UK’s enduring post-colonial attitudes towards race and class (Akala, 2018; Danewid, 2020; El-Enany, 2019). Had the victims of the Grenfell Fire been white and rich like the RBKC’s council members, it’s almost certain their complaints would’ve been addressed and their deaths prevented.
Furthermore, structural classism and racism have long been the driving force behind the UK’s state-led gentrification strategies that continue to threaten social housing communities across London (Lees & White, 2020). Between 2012 and 2015, over 50,000 families were driven out of London due to gentrification, making way for wealthier newcomers and private real estate development companies (The Independent, 2015). In the north of the RBKC, the council practised a strategy of ‘managed decline’, allowing community spaces to fall into disrepair to create a case for redevelopment (Bennhold, 2017). Ultimately, these redevelopment projects only served to increase the price of local amenities, resulting in the ‘social cleansing’ of the existing ethnically diverse working-class populations living there (Vulliamy, 2017). Such is the case with the presently ongoing gentrification of Lancaster West Estate, which provided the rationale behind Grenfell Tower’s deadly renovations, the idea being that nicer-looking buildings attracted wealthier residents (Cooper & Whyte, 2022; Rozena, 2022).
The renovations themselves were driven by commercial interests, resulting in cost-cutting strategies that severely compromised the safety of Grenfell Tower. Plans to renovate Lancaster West Estate date as far back as December 2011, when the KCTMO listed it as one of its top five priorities for investment. The RBKC set aside an initial budget of £6 million for the renovations in May 2012, which was later increased to £9.7 million in July 2013 and finally £10.3 million a year later (Davies, et al., 2019). The KCTMO eventually settled on Rydon to carry out the renovations on a £8.6 million contract, approximately £1.7 million under the RBKC’s budget, which then subcontracted Harley Facades to install the external cladding for £2.6 million (Davies, 2017a). The original plan was to use fire-resistant zinc panels. However, this was later switched to the flammable Reynobond PE panels, without residents’ knowledge, in order to reduce costs by £293,368 on the RBKC’s request (Booth & Grierson, 2017). This penchant for stinginess when it came to Grenfell Tower is particularly concerning when you consider the RBKC had happily contributed £14.6 million to the redesign of upper-class Exhibition Road and had built up a reserve of £274 million by the time of the fire (BBC, 2012; Tamplin, 2017). Thus, when it came to the well-being of demographics deemed undesirable, the RBKC was more than willing to cut corners for the sake of private profit, and the UK’s inadequate building regulations made it possible to do so.
When placed in its socio-economic context, it becomes apparent that the causes of the Grenfell Fire are rooted in societal failings. Post-colonial attitudes regarding race and class are the driving force behind state-led gentrification strategies, informing the RBKC’s negligent behaviour towards its poorer constituents in the north of the borough. It was when these attitudes were combined with commercial interests and lax building regulations that the safety of Grenfell Tower was eventually compromised, leading to the catastrophic events on the 14th June, 2017. As such, the key to solving the systemic failure and neglect that led to the Grenfell Fire lies in addressing the underlying structural classism and racism that allowed it to occur in the first place.
Conclusion
To recap, this essay has scrutinised the tragedy of the Grenfell Fire, laying bare the grim intersection of inadequate building regulations, government negligence, and societal disparities that culminated in the most devastating residential fire the UK has ever seen. From the structural design flaws to the numerous fire safety violations, the confluence of cost-cutting measures and regulatory oversights not only facilitated the rapid spread of the fire but also starkly underscored the lethal consequences of prioritising profit over human lives.
As I’ve demonstrated through the analysis of Grenfell Tower’s structural design weaknesses, regulatory lapses, and the socio-economic context in which these events occurred, it becomes undeniably clear that the fire was a preventable catastrophe rooted in systemic failure spanning several layers of governance and policymaking. The persistent dismissal of residents’ safety concerns by the RBKC, coupled with the government’s sluggish pace in updating building regulations, reflects a broader cultural malaise in which the voices of the marginalised are systematically sidelined.
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry has shed some light on these issues, yet the journey towards genuine accountability and reform remains fraught with challenges. It is imperative for policymakers to not only recognise but actively rectify the structural inequities that laid the groundwork for such a tragedy. This involves a steadfast commitment to revamping housing regulations, ensuring rigorous compliance with fire safety standards, and, most crucially, re-evaluating urban development policies through a lens that prioritises the safety and well-being of all residents, irrespective of their race and class.
To truly honour the memory of those lost in the Grenfell fire, our response must transcend mere technical fixes to address the deeper, systemic injustices that the tragedy so painfully exposed. This calls for a holistic reform of the housing sector that not only prevents such tragedies in the future but also rebuilds trust in a system that has failed its most vulnerable. As we move forward, we must let the lessons of the Grenfell Fire ignite a relentless pursuit of safety, equity, and justice within our societal frameworks, ensuring that no community is ever again left so disastrously behind.
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